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Abstract
In the study of the evolution of cooperation, many mechanisms have been proposed to help
overcome the self-interested cheating that is individually optimal in he Prisoners’ Dilemma and
other social dilemmas. These mechanisms include assortative or networked social interactions,
reciprocity rules to establish cooperation as a social norm, or simultaneous competition between
individuals favoring cheaters and competition between groups favoring cooperators. Here, we build
on recent mathematical tools describing the dynamics of multilevel selection to to consider the
role that assortment and reciprocity mechanisms play in facilitating cooperation in concert with
multilevel selection. Using a deterministic partial differential equation variant of the replicator
equation including the effects of within-group and between-group competition, we demonstrate
the synergistic effects between population structure within groups and the competitive ability of
cooperative groups when groups compete according to collective payoff.
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1 Introduction
It is helpful for many biological questions to explore through the lens of multilevel selection, examining
how there are conflicts between selective forces operating at different organizational levels. Selection
on multiple levels readily arises in settings varying from the formation of protocells and the origins of
life [1–3], collective behavior in animal groups [4], the evolution of aggressive or cooperative behavior
of ant queens [5], host-microbe mutualisms in the microbiome [6], and competition between pathogen
strains under both immunological dynamics and epidemiological dynamics [7, 8]. The evolution of
cooperation provides a useful case study for questions of multilevel selection, and evolutionary game
theory provides an instructive analytical framework for analyzing the tension between the interests of
a group and the interests of the individuals comprising the group.
In the literature of evolution of cooperation, there has been an emphasis on the roles of popu-
lation structure in facilitating the possibility of cooperation that cannot be achieved on its own in a
well-mixed population described by a Wright-Fisher or Moran process in finite populations or by the
replicator dynamics in the infinite population limit. In particular, Nowak identifies five key mechanisms
for promotion of the evolution of cooperation: kin selection / assortment, direct reciprocity, indirect
reciprocity, network reciprocity, and group / multilevel selection [9]. We explore how several of these
other interaction structures can be combined with multilevel selection in the search to achieve cooper-
ation. In some sense, the evolution of cooperation within a group can be considered the emergence of
an entity operating at a higher level of selection [3, 9]. Achieving higher levels of biological complexity
can be buoyed by mechanisms which hinder the lower-level advantages of cheater types. The break-
down of regulatory mechanisms like programmed cell death or copy number regulation is considered a
characteristic property of cancer [10] and can be associated with aging through the eventual dominance
of cheater types in mitochondrial DNA evolution [11].
A model of multilevel selection in evolutionary games was introduced by Traulsen and Nowak
[12] and further studied by Traulsen et al and Bötcher and Nagler [13, 14]. As a baseline model for
multilevel selection, we will take the multilevel replicator dynamics introduced by Luo and coauthors
[15–17] and extended to multilevel games by Cooney [18, 19]. Luo introduced a stochastic description
for a two-level selection process with two types of individuals, one with an advantage at individual-
level reproduction and the other conferring an advantage to its group in group-level reproduction.
The multilevel replicator dynamics is a deterministic partial differential equation (PDE) description of
the distribution of the composition of cooperators and defectors in groups, with two terms describing
the effects of within-group competition and between-group competition. This framework provides an
analytically tractable approach to study the conflicts between these levels of selection, and can be
extended to include more realism for group-level events [20–24].
In previous work on the multilevel replicator dynamics, the main characterization of the behavior
of the multilevel dynamics is to determine whether within-group or between-group dynamics dominate
in the long run, and whether the population converges to a delta-concentration at equilibrium of the
within-group dynamics or if the population achieves a nontrivial steady state producing additional
cooperation [17–19]. A particularly interesting phenomenon found in this analysis is the shadow of
lower-level selection: for games in which groups are best off with a mix of cooperators and defectors,
no level of between-group competition strength can produce the optimal proportion of cooperators
[18, 19]. In this paper, we will explore whether implementing mechanisms of assortment or reciprocity
can facilitate cooperation via multilevel selection, and we are particularly interested in seeing whether
these mechanisms can help to erase the shadow of lower-level selection.
Several authors have studied the evolution of cooperation in the context of group selection and
assortment [25, 26]. In those models, assortative mechanisms are used to form groups for game-theoretic
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interactions, promoting cooperation in the population by allowing cooperators to cluster together. Here,
we instead consider group identities that are fixed in time, but that the game-theoretic interactions
within each group follow an assortment or reciprocity rule that can help to promote cooperation
through simultaneous competition within groups based on individual payoff and competition between
groups based on the average payoff of group members. In particular, we are interested in the different
ways in which altering the interactions with peer group members can change the shape of the function
describing average payoff of group members, helping to move from a payoff regime in which groups are
best off with a mix of cooperators or defectors to a regime in which between-group competition most
favors full-cooperator groups. By doing this, we hope to explore the extent to which we can mitigate
the effects of the shadow of lower-level selection, and help to promote the possibility of establishing full-
cooperation for sufficiently strong relative levels of between-group competition even when our payoff
function favors intermediate cooperation under well-mixed interactions.
First, we consider an extension of these multilevel selection model in which strategic interactions
are assortative: cooperators are more likely to interact with cooperators and defectors are more likely
to interact with defectors. We follow the approach of Grafen [27] by assuming that individuals have
a greater probability of interacting with individual with the same strategy. This can be used to
model the effects of relatedness and kin selection, or to understand how strategy-based homophily
can be used to promote cooperation. Mechanisms of assortative interactions individuals have been
explored by Eshel and Cavalli-Sforza [28], and Bergstrom has provided analysis of a wide variety of
assortative matching mechanisms [29–31]. An endogenous model of strategic homophily or heterophily
was introduced by Pacheco et al [32, 33], in which individuals create and break links based on payoff
received through interactions on the link, which can serve as a microfoundation for the exogenous
assortment probabilities.
We also consider an extension of this model in which strategic interactions occur on a k-regular
random graph [34, 35], and show that graph interactions can, in effect, change a game from one in
which group average payoff is maximized for intermediate cooperation to one in which full cooperation
is optimal for groups. We also explore the role of reciprocity, manifested as rewards for cooperation
or punishment for defection. We study both models of direct and indirect reciprocity, distinguished
by whether one punishes an individual who cheated against one in the past or whether one punishes
individuals who have a reputation for cheating against anyone. For indirect reciprocity, we take Nowak
and Sigmund’s model in which cooperators have a probability of identifying a defector through their
reputation and punishing the defector by defecting as well [36]. For direct reciprocity, we study
the competition between defectors and individuals playing the Tit-for-Tat strategy in the repeated
Prisoners’ Dilemma as initially studied by Axelrod [37–39].
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we present the original model
for the multilevel replicator dynamics, and describe the general behavior of the multilevel dynamics
in the presence of an arbitrary mechanism of assortment or reciprocity. In Section 3, we address
the model of assortative interactions. In Sections 4 and 5 we address indirect reciprocity and direct
reciprocity, respectively. We consider the role of network reciprocity in the special case of games on
k-regular graphs with death-birth updating in Section 6. We conclude in Section 7 with a discussion
on the behaviors found across the models and connections with the well-mixed model and the shadow
of lower-level selection.
2 Evolutionary Games and Replicator Dynamics
Here we will illustrate the baseline model for deterministic multilevel selection for evolutionary games
with well-mixed strategic interactions, as in Cooney [18]. We consider two-strategy games, in which
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individuals can either choose to Cooperate (C) or Defect (D), and individuals receive payoff from
pairwise interaction given by the following payoff matrix
C D( )
C R S
D T P
(2.1)
where the payoffs correspond toReward, Sucker, Temptation, and Punishment. Four games of interest
to our analysis are the Prisoners’ Dilemma (PD), the Hawk-Dove (HD) game, the stag hunt (SH), and
the Prisoners’ Delight (PDel), which are characterized by the following rankings of payoffs [40]
PD : T > R > P > S (2.2a)
HD : T > R > S > P (2.2b)
SH :R > T > P > S (2.2c)
PDel : R > T > S > P. (2.2d)
In terms of individual payoff dynamics, the PD promotes dominance of defectors, the HD game pro-
motes coexistence of cooperators and defectors, the SH promotes bistability between dominance of
defectors and dominance of cooperators, and the PDel promotes dominance of cooperators.
In a group composed of fraction x cooperators and 1−x defectors, the expected payoffs received
by cooperators and defectors in well-mixed interactions are
piC(x) = xR+ (1− x)S (2.3)
piD(x) = xT + (1− x)P (2.4)
and the average payoff of individuals in a group with x fraction cooperators is
G(x) = xpiC(x) + (1− x)piD(x) = P + (R− S − T + P )x+ (S + T − 2P )x2 (2.5)
Recently, the multilevel selection framework of Luo and Mattingly was applied to study the
simultaneous competition between individuals based on individual payoff and competition between
groups following the average payoff of group members [17–19]. A non-local partial differential equation
was derived to describe the changing probability density of groups at time t composed of a fraction
of x cooperators, f(t, x), which is the natural analogue of the replicator dynamics in the context of
multilevel selection. The dynamics are given by
(2.6)
∂f(t, x)
∂t
= − ∂
∂x
[x(1− x) (piC(x)− piD(x)) f(t, x)] + λf(t, x)
[
G(x)−
∫ 1
0
G(y)f(t, y)dy
]
For two-strategy social dilemmas, there are three generic behaviors of interest for the within-
group dynamics and how the within-group dynamics relate to the between-group dynamics. For the
Prisoners’ Dilemma, the full-defector equilibrium (x = 0) is globally stable under the within-group
replicator dynamics, while the Hawk-Dave game has a globally stable interior equilibrium, and the Stag-
Hunt and Prisoners’ Delight games feature local stability full-cooperator groups. General behaviors
have been shown to appear for these three archetypal games, which can depend on the Hölder exponent
near x = 1 of the initial density f0(x), a property of the tail of the initial distribution [19].
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Definition 2.1. The Hölder exponent θt of the probability distribution with density f(t, x) near x = 1
satisfies
θt = inf
Θ≥0
{
lim
y→0
∫ 1
1−y f(t, z)dz
yΘ
}
> 0
For the PD and HD games, it was shown that the Hölder exponent near x = 1 is preserved in
time for solutions to Equation 2.6. We now describe the generic behaviors of the PD, HD, and SH
games that can stand in for games played with our structured population mechanisms [19].
1. For PD games with an initial distribution with Hölder exponent θ near x = 1, there is a threshold
level of relative selection strength
λ∗PD =
(piD(1)− piC(1)) θ
(G(1)−G(0)) (2.7)
such that the population f(t, x) → δ(x) (concentration upon the full-defector equilibrium) if
λ < λ∗PD. If λ > λ
∗, there is a unique steady state with Hölder exponent θ near x = 1, so we
conjecture that the population will converge to this steady state.
2. For HD games with an initial distribution with Hölder exponent θ near x = 1, there is a threshold
level of relative selection strength
λ∗HD =
(piD(1)− piC(1)) θ
(G(1)−G(xeq)) (2.8)
such that the population f(t, x)→ δ(x− xeq) (concentration upon the within-group HD equilib-
rium) if λ < λ∗HD. If λ > λ
∗, there is a unique steady state with Hölder exponent θ near x = 1,
so we conjecture that the population will converge to this steady state.
3. For SH and PDel games, the population converges to δ(1 − x), a delta mass at x = 1, if λ > 0
and at least some initial probability is located in the basin of attraction of the full-cooperator
equilibrium.
We can also characterize the different parameter regimes for which games follow PD, HD, SH,
or PDel within group dynamics and have group payoff functions either most favoring full-cooperation
or an intermediate level of cooperation using the following parameterization of the payoff matrix from
Equation 2.1. Here, we use the notation inspired by the donation game, in which cooperators pay
a cost c to confer a benefit b to their opponents, and include an extra term d representing possible
(positive or negative) synergies for mutual cooperation [41]
C D( )
C b− c+ d −c
D b 0
. (2.9)
Under this representation of the payoff matrix, we can characterize the four regimes for within-group
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dynamics using the following rankings of parameters
PD : − b < 0, d < c (2.10a)
HD : − b < d < c < 0 (2.10b)
SH : − b < 0 < c < d (2.10c)
PDel : − b < c < 0, d. (2.10d)
Additionally, we see that the individual payoffs of cooperators and defectors can be written as piC(x) =
(b+d)x− c and piD(x) = bx, while the average payoff of group members is given by G(x) = (b− c)x+
dx2. Therefore the multilevel dynamics can be rewritten under this parameterization as
∂f(t, x)
∂t
= − ∂
∂x
[x(1− x) (dx− c) f(t, x)] + λf(t, x)
[
(b− c)x+ dx2 −
∫ 1
0
(
(b− c)y + dy2) f(t, y)dy] .
(2.11)
Because c and d show up in the expressions both for individual and group average payoff, we can see
that these parameters can be used to delineate the different within-group regimes as well as between
games for which collective payoff is maximized by full-cooperation or by a mix of cooperation and
defection. We illustrate the possible regimes of our multilevel dynamics for fixed b and various values
of c and d in Figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1: Depiction of the different within-group and between-group regimes in terms of the cost and synergy
parameters c and d, for fixed benefit b = 1. The gray shaded region corresponds to games for which group payoff
is maximized by an intermediate level of cooperation x∗, while unshaded region corresponds to games for which
group payoff is maximized by full-cooperation.
From Equation 2.7, we see that the threshold for achieving steady-state cooperation under the
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PD within-group regime is given by
λ∗PD =
c− d
b− c+ d =
b
b− c+ d − 1, (2.12)
In particular, this tells us that the threshold λ∗PD is a decreasing function of the synergy parameter d,
so increasing the synergy of mutual cooperation makes it easier to achieve cooperation via multilevel
selection.
2.1 Generalized Dynamics
Before we introduce the specific assortment and reciprocity mechanisms, we will study a more general
two-level selection process that contains the dynamics with these mechanisms as a special case. We
consider a game with a structure parameter ς, which could represent assortment, neighborhood size,
social reputation, etc. This can be thought of in a somewhat similar manner to the structure coefficient
σ for fixation probabilities of cooperation in evolutionary games in structured populations [42, 43], but
there is no intention right now to unify the concept in the same way. Cooperators and defectors receive
payoffs piςC(x) and pi
ς
D(x) in group with x fraction of cooperators, whiles groups with x fraction of
cooperators receives average payoff of
Gς(x) = xpiςC(x) + (1− x)piςD(x)
For all of the examples we will study, it is fine to assume that the defector’s advantage is an affine
function of the form piςD(x)− piςC(x) = a+ bx, and therefore the advantage varies constantly with x, or
∂
∂x
[
piςD(x)− piςC(x)
]
= b. Multilevel dynamics follow modified replicator dynamics given by
∂f(t, x)
∂t
= − ∂
∂x
(
x(1− x)(piςC(x)− piςD(x))f(t, x)
)
+ λf(t, x)
(
Gς(x)− 〈G(·)〉f(t,x)
)
(2.13)
In the PD regime of the structured population dynamics, we can look to find steady state solutions
of Equation 2.13. We can find that, if all-defection is the within-group equilibrium, that steady states
of Equation 2.13 satisfy the implicit expression
f(x) =
1
Zf
x
(
λ〈G〉f
piς
D
(0)−piς
C
(0)
)
−1
(1− x)
(
λ(G(1)−〈G〉f)
piς
D
(1)−piς
C
(1)
)
−1 (
piςD(x)− piςC(x)
)(λ〈G〉f−G(xςeq)
bxeq(1−xeq)
)
−1
(2.14)
Recalling that the Hölder exponent θ near x = 1 is preserved for our multilevel dynamics, it is reason-
able to parameterize our steady state solutions by this quantity. Because we have a density description,
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we use Equation 2.14 to compute that
lim
y→0
y−Θ
(∫ 1
1−y
f(x)dx
)
= lim
y→0
Z
−1
f y
−Θ

∫ 1
1−y
x
(
λ〈G〉f
piς
D
(0)−piς
C
(0)
)
−1
(1− x)
(
λ(G(1)−〈G〉f)
piς
D
(1)−piς
C
(1)
)
−1
(
piςD(x)− piςC(x)
)(G(xeq)−λ〈G〉f
bxeq(1−xeq)
)
+1
 dx


= lim
y→0

(
ΘZfy
Θ−1)−1
(1− y)
(
λ〈G〉f
piς
D
(0)−piς
C
(0)
)
−1
(y)
(
λ(G(1)−〈G〉f)
piς
D
(1)−piς
C
(1)
)
−1
(
piςD(1− y)− piςC(1− y)
)(G(xeq)−λ〈G〉f
bxeq(1−xeq)
)
+1


= (ΘZf )
−1 (piςD(1)− piςC(1))
(
λ〈G〉f−G(xeq)
bxeq(1−xeq)
)
−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
:=K
 lim
y→0
y
(
λ(G(1)−〈G〉f)
piς
D
(1)−piς
C
(1)
)
−Θ

=

0 : Θ <
λ(G(1)−〈G〉f)
piςD(1)−piςC(1)
(θZf )
−1K : Θ = λ(G(1)−〈G〉f)piςD(1)−piςC(1)
∞ : Θ > λ(G(1)−〈G〉f)piςD(1)−piςC(1)
Using the definition of Hölder exponent, we see that the the Hölder exponent θ near x = 1 is given by
θ =
λ (G(1)− 〈G〉f )
piςD(1)− piςC(1)
(2.15)
Using this expression, we can rewrite our steady state densities in terms of θ as follows
(2.16)
fθ(x) = Z
−1
f x
(λGς(1)−[piςD(1)−piςC(1)]θ−1) (1− x)θ−1
× (piςD(x)− piςC(x))
(
λ(Gς (1)−Gς (xςeq))−[piςD(1)−pi
ς
C
(1)]θ
bxςeq(1−xςeq)
)
−1
In order for this probability density to be integrable (and therefore actually a probability density)
there is a threshold level of between-group competition required to obtain any cooperation through
between-group competition
λ∗ς =
(
piςD(1)− piςC(1)
)
θ
Gς(1)
(2.17)
For these steady states, we can use Equation 2.15 to find that the average payoff of population
is
〈G(·)〉f(x) = Gσ(1) +
(piσC(1)− piσD(1)) θ
λ
(2.18)
In particular, we can rewrite the expression for the average payoff of the population at steady
state by using the threshold selection intensity λ∗ς , which gives us
〈Gς(·)〉f(x) = Gς(1)
[
1− λ
∗
ς
λ
]
(2.19)
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so we see 〈Gς(·)〉f(x) ranges from 0 at λ = λ∗ς to Gς(1) as λ→∞. Notably, this means that the average
payoff of the population is limited by the average payoff of full cooperator groups. Then, for group
fitness functions Gς(x) maximized at an intermediate level of cooperation, the steady state population
cannot achieve the maximal average payoff possible to the population, even as selection strength at
the between-group level becomes infinitely strong.
Similarly, we can show, in the case that xςeq is the stable equilibrium of the within-group dynamics,
that steady state densities take the form
fθ(x) =
{
0 : x < xςeq
p(x) : x ≥ xςeq (2.20)
where p(x) is given by the righthand side of Equation 2.16. In the latter case, in order for the steady
state density to be integrable near xςeq, we need the exponent of pi
ς
D(x) − piςC(x) to exceed −1, or we
equivalently require that
λ
(
Gς(1)−Gς(xςeq)
)− [piςD(1)− piςC(1)] θ
bxςeq (1− xςeq) > 0
Because the defector’s advantage is increasing in x,we know that bxςeq(1− xςeq) > 0, and therefore this
condition becomes
λ > λ∗∗ς =
(
piςD(1)− piςC(1)
)
θ
Gς(1)−Gς(xςeq) (2.21)
Noting that when xςeq = 0 we have that Gς(xςeq) = Gς(0) = 0, it turns out that our for integrability
of steady states given by Equations 2.17 and 2.21 coincide precisely when the interior within-group
equilibrium xςeq coincides with the full-defection within-group equilibrium. As a consequence, the
threshold level of between group selection needed to obtain cooperation in excess of that achieved by
within-group selection alone passes continuously from λ∗ς to λ∗∗ς as the structure parameter ς varies to
alter the within-group dynamics from favoring full-defection to favoring an interior mix of cooperation
and defection.
When xςeq is the stable equilibrium of within-group dynamics, we can use our expression for
threshold group-level selection strength λ∗∗ς to describe average payoff at steady state, yielding
〈Gς (·)〉fθ(x) = Gς(1)−
(
λ∗∗ς
λ
)(
Gς(1)−Gς(xςeq)
)
(2.22)
so we see that 〈Gς (·)〉fθ(x) ranges from Gς(xςeq) when λ = λ∗∗ς to Gς(1) when λ→∞.
We can also study the group type that is most abundant at steady state. As λ → ∞, we find
that the modal group type ends up converging to the type of group which achieves the same average
payoff as a full-cooperator group.We demonstrate this behavior in Proposition 2.1. In particular, this
phenomenon means that if the full-cooperator group has the maximal average payoff out of all possible
group compositions, then the highest payoff group is also most abundant at steady state when between-
group competition becomes infinitely stronger than within-group competition. However, when there is
an intermediate group optimum x∗ς for the group payoff function Gς(x), then the most abundant group
type will have fewer cooperators and a lower collective payoff that the best possible group payoff, even
in the limit as λ → ∞ and between-group selection should dominate the dynamics. This behavior,
which has been detailed for the multilevel dynamics of two-player, two-strategy symmetric games with
game-theoeretic interactions in well-mixed groups [18, 19], can be thought of as the individual-level
selection casting a long shadow on the dynamics of multilevel selection.
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Proposition 2.1. Suppose θ ≥ 1. The most abundant group composition in the steady state density
fλθ (x) is given by
xˆ∞ = lim
λ→∞
xˆλ = min
1, Gς(1)
−
(
a
bGς(1) +
Gς(1)−Gς(xeq)
xeq(1−xeq)
)
 (2.23)
Proof. We start by differentiating
dfλθ
dx
= Z−1f g(x)x
b−1(λGς(1)−(piςD(1)−piςC(1))θ)−2 (1− x)θ−2
× (piςD(x)− piςC(x))λ(Gς (1)−Gς (xeq))−(piςD(1)−piςC (1))θaxeq(1−xeq) −2
where g(x) is given by
g(x) =
[
λGς(1)−
(
piςD(1)− piςC(1)
)
θ
b
− 1
]
(1− x) (piςD(x)− piςC(x))− (θ − 1)x (piςD(x)− piςC(x))
+
(
∂piςD(x)
∂x
− ∂pi
ς
C(x)
∂x
)[
λ (Gς(1)−Gς(xeq))−
(
piςD(1)− piςC(1)
)
θ
axeq(1− xeq)
]
x (1− x)
For convenience, we will now use the shorthand notation ∆G = G(1) −G(xeq), ∆pi = piςD(1) − piςC(1),
and E = (xeq (1− xeq))−1. Noting that piςD(x) − piςC(x) = b + ax and
(
piςD(x)− piςC(x)
)′
= a, we can
rewrite our expression for g(x) as the quadratic function
g(x) =
[
λGς(1)−∆Gθ
b
− 1
]
(1− x) (b+ ax)− (θ − 1)x (b+ ax) + (λ∆G −∆piθ)Ex (1− x)
=
[
−λG(1)a
b
− λ∆GE − (θ − 1) a+ ∆piθE
]
x2
+
[(a
b
− 1
)
λG(1) + λ∆GE +
(
1− a
b
)
∆piθ + (θ − 1) a−∆piθE
]
x+ λG(1)−∆piθ − b
We know that the critical points of fλθ (x) correspond to the roots of g(x).
(2.24)
xˆλ± =
λ
[(
1− ab
)
G(1)−∆GE
]
+
(
a
b − 1
)
∆piθ + (1− θ) + ∆piθE
2
[
−λ
(
aG(1)
b + ∆GE
)
− (θ − 1) a+ ∆piθE
]
±
√√√√√√√
(
λ
[(
1− a
b
)
G(1)−∆GE
]
+
(a
b
− 1
)
∆piθ + (1− θ) + ∆piθE
)2
+ 4
(
λG(1)a
b
+ λ∆GE + (θ − 1) a−∆piθE
)
(λG(1)−∆piθ − b)
2
[
−λ
(
aG(1)
b + ∆GE
)
− (θ − 1) a+ ∆piθE
]
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Using the notation o(f(λ)) to denote any quantity g such that limλ→∞ gf(λ) = 0, we can further express
the roots of g(x) as
xˆλ± =
λ
[(
1− ab
)
G(1)−∆GE
]
+ o(λ)
2
[
−λ
(
aG(1)
b + ∆GE
)
− (θ − 1) a+ ∆piθE
]
±
√[(
1− ab
)
G(1)−∆GE
]2
λ2 + 4
(
aG(1)
b + ∆GE
)
G(1)λ2 + o(λ2)
2
[
−λ
(
aG(1)
b + ∆GE
)
− (θ − 1) a+ ∆piθE
]
=
λ
[(
1− ab
)
G(1)−∆GE
]
+ o(λ)∓
√[(
1 + ab
)
G(1) + ∆GE
]2
2
[
−λ
(
aG(1)
b + ∆GE
)
− (θ − 1) a+ ∆piθE
]
Considering the limit of large between-group selection λ, we see that
lim
λ→∞
xλ± =
(
1− ab
)
G(1)−∆GE ±
((
1 + ab
)
G(1) + ∆GE
)
−2
(
aG(1)
b + ∆GE
)
Simplifying our expression tells us that the critical points of g(x) take the form
xˆ∞ = lim
λ→∞
xλ± ∈
{
1,
−G(1)
aG(1)
b + ∆GE
}
In the limit as λ→∞, the two possible modal group types at steady state become the full-cooperator
group x = 1 and a group type that can potentially correspond to an intermediate level of cooperation
x = xˆint :=
−G(1)
aG(1)
b
+∆GE
. We note that g(0) = λG(1) − ∆piθ − b = b
(
λG(1)−(piςD(1)−piςC(1))θ
b − 1
)
> 0,
where we know that the inequality is satisfied for any density steady state due to the threshold condition
on λ from Equation 2.17. If xˆint < 0 or xˆint ≥ 1, then the quadratic function g(x) is positive for x ∈ [0, 1)
and reaches zero when g(1) = 0. If xˆint ∈ (0, 1), we instead see that g(x) is positive for x ∈ [0, xˆint) and
negative for x ∈ (xˆint, 1). Because the sign of g(x) and df
λ
θ (x)
dx
agree on the interior of the support of
fλθ (x), this means that f
λ
θ (x) has a global maximum at the interior root xˆint if it biologically feasible.
When it is infeasible (xˆint 6∈ [0, 1]), we instead see that fλθ (x) increases for all x ∈ [0, 1] and therefore
the model group type at steady state is the full-cooperator group with x = 1. Recalling the formulas
for xˆint, ∆G, and E, we see that the formula of Equation 2.23 is therefore satisfied.
3 Within-Group Assortment
We consider game-theoretic interactions within groups which follow an r-assortment process as intro-
duced by Grafen and studied in various deterministic and stochastic settings [27, 44–46]. In particular,
we assume a form of like-with-like assortment in which, with probability r, individuals play the game
with an individual with the same strategy, while, with probability 1−r, individuals play the game with
a randomly chosen member of their group. In an infinitely large group with a fraction x of cooperators,
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the expected payoff of a cooperator pirC(x) and of a defector pi
r
D(x) under this assortment process is
pirC(x) = rR+ (1− r)piC(x) = rR+ (1− r)(xR+ (1− x)S) (3.1a)
pirD(x) = rP + (1− r)piD(x) = rP + (1− r)(xT + (1− x)P ) (3.1b)
We can also understand the role of the assortment process by describing the expected payoff with the
following transformed payoff matrix for well-mixed interactions [9, 47]
C D( )
C R (1− r)S + rR
D (1− r)T + rP P (3.2)
We see that the within-group replicator dynamics are given by
dx(t)
dt
= x(1− x) [pirC(x)− pirD(x)] = x(1− x) [r (γ + α) + (1− r) (β + αx)] (3.3)
The within-group dynamics have equilibria at 0, 1, and a third point xeqr satisfying pirC(x
eq
r ) = pirD(x
eq
r ).
Using Equation 3.3, we see that this third potentially interior equilibrium is given by
xreq = −
β
α
+
(
r
1− r
)(
γ + α
−α
)
(3.4)
We note that ∂x
r
eq
∂r =
(
γ+α
−α
)(
1
(1−r)2
)
> 0 when α < 0, so the potential interior equilibrium level
of within-group cooperation is increasing in r. Furthermore, we see that there exists rsW and r
a
W such
that for any r ∈ [rsW , raW ], xreq ∈ [0, 1]. We choose this notation to indicate that rsW is the minimum
value of r above which some (s) cooperation is promoted by within-group selection, which is achieved
by the r at which xreq = 0, which is found from Equation 3.4 to be
rsW =
−β
−β + γ + α ∈ (0, 1) (3.5)
Similarly, we define raW as the minimum level of r above which all cooperation (a) is favored by within-
group selection, and corresponds to the level of r at which xreq = 1, which we can find via Equation
3.4 to be
raW =
− (α+ β)
γ − β ≥ r
s
W (3.6)
where we know the last inequality because xreq is increasing in r and that x0eq = xeq = −βα < 0 for PDs
with α < 0. In this paper, we are primarily focused on the case of the PD in which group payoff can
have an intermediate optimum, so most of our analysis assumes α < 0. If instead we considered α > 0,
we would find that xreq would start out above 1 when r = 0 and that xreq is a decreasing function of
r, resulting in a region of bistability of full-cooperation and full-defection before cooperation becomes
dominant for sufficiently large r. We will address the multilevel dynamics of the α > 0 case briefly,
but we will delay discussion of the bistable within-group dynamics until Section 4, in which bistable
within-group dynamics arise for underlying PD games with intermediate group payoff maxima.
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The average payoff for a group with interactions following an r-process is given by
Gr(x) = xpi
r
C(x) + (1− x)pirD(x) (3.7)
= r [P + (R− P )x] + (1− r) [P + (S + T − 2P )x+ (R− S − T + P )x2] (3.8)
We see that the group payoff function interpolates between the group payoff function for well-mixed
interations G0(x) = γx + αx2 = G(x) when r = 0 to an affine function of cooperator composition
G1(x) = P + (γ + α)x. The dynamics of G1(x) under Equation 2.13 are equivalent to the dynamics of
the Luo-Mattingly model or the α = 0 case of the PD under the well-mixed dynamics of Equation 2.6.
Noting that G′r(x) = (1− r)(S + T − 2P ) + r(R− P ) + 2x(R− S − T + P ), we see that average
group payoff is maximized by the fraction of cooperators x∗r given by
x∗r =

(1− r)(S + T − 2P ) + r(R− P )
2(S + T −R− P ) : r < rB
1 : r ≥ rB
for rB = S+T−2RR−S−T+P . In terms of our parameters α, β, and γ, the critical assortment parameter above
which between-group competition most favors full-cooperator groups is
rB = 2− γ|α| .
Notably, this means that rB = 0 (no assortment needed) for full-cooperator groups to achieve optimal
average payoff when γ = −α, while there exists an rB ∈ (0, 1) such that the most fit group composition
x∗r is less than 1 for r < rB and is the full-cooperator group for r ≥ rB. This means that any
Prisoners’ Dilemma whose average payoff is maximized by intermediate fractions of cooperator for well-
mixed within-group interactions can have maximal average payoff achieved by full-cooperator groups
if interactions occur with sufficiently strong assortment, so assortment can be used as a mechanism to
overcome the shadow of lower level selection. We also note that when α < 0 (i.e. our main case of
interest)
dx∗r
dr
= − 2α(γ + α)
4α2(1− r)2 =
|α|(γ + α)
2α2(1− r)2 > 0 because γ + α = R− P > 0
which means that assortment always increases the level of cooperation in the group composition that
maximizes average payoff, pushing the goal of between-group competition to fix on the type without
the individual-level advantage. Eventually, x∗r will increase to the full-cooperator group when r = rB.
Furthermore, we can study the average payoff of the highest payoff group by plugging in the value of
x∗r into the group payoff function Gr(x), yielding
Gr(x
∗
r) = (γ + αr)
(
γ + αr
−2(1− r)α
)
+ α (1− r)
(
γ + αr
−2(1− r)α
)2
=
(γ + αr)2
4α2(1− r)2 . (3.9)
Specifically, we can show that average payoff of the highest payoff is increasing in r when x∗r < 1,
as we can compute
∂Gr(x
∗
r)
∂r
=
−α
4(1− r)2α2
[
(1− r) (γ + αr) + (γ + αr)2] > 0 (3.10)
where the inequality holds because we are considering PDs with α < 0 and γ + αr > γ + α > 0 for
r ≤ 1. From this, we see that the best possible outcome involves higher average payoffs as we increase
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the assortment probability r.
From our characterization of the within-group dynamics and group payoff function, we construct
two possible bifurcation diagrams for the assortment process in Figure 3.1. We do not have a definitive
ordering on rsW and rB, but we do know that r
s
W < rB and rB < r
a
W for all PDs with α < 0, and
therefore we include both the possibilities that rB < rsW < r
a
W (left) and r
s
W < rB < r
a
W (right). In
the former case, we have left the regime of intermediate payoff optima and the shadow of lower-level
selection while the multilevel dynamics are still in PD regime, while in the latter case we first transition
from the PD regime to the HD regime and then encounter group payoff functions that are maximized
by full-cooperator groups. In either case, we see that the multilevel assortment dynamics starting out
in the PD regime with intermediate fitness optima first shift to the HD multilevel regime and then into
the PDel regime.
Figure 3.1: Bifurcation diagram for within-group replicator dynamics and group type with maximal average
payoff in assortment model. The green lines refer to the group composition which maximizes average payoff of
group members x∗r . Solid blue lines refer to stable equilibria of the within-group dynamics, while dashed blue
lines describe unstable equilibria. The gray dot-dashed lines refer to the levels of assortment above which group
payoff is maximized by full-cooperator groups rB , some level of cooperation can be achieved by within-group
selection alone rsW , and all-cooperation can be achieved by within-group selection r
a
W .
We can further understand the content of the above bifurcation diagram by rewriting the trans-
formed payoffs of Equation 3.2 in terms of the benefit-cost-synergy formulation of our social dilemmas.
Under this parameterization, the payoffs of cooperators and defectors are transformed under the as-
sortment process to take the form
C D( )
C b− c+ d − (1− r) c+ r (b− c+ d)
D (1− r)b 0 . (3.11)
We can further think of the transformed benefits, costs, and synergies in terms of the expressions
br = (1− r)b (3.12a)
cr = (1− r)c− r (b− c+ d) (3.12b)
dr = (1− r)d. (3.12c)
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Now that we see how cr and dr change with the assortment parameter r, we can reiterate information
from the bifurcation diagram from Figure 3.1 by showing how the payoffs move through the different
regimes for within-group dynamics and between-group competition as we vary q. In Figure 4.2, we
illustrate this for the two example games considered in the bifurcation diagram, showing how the first
game (left) first transitions between favoring intermediate cooperation to favoring full cooperation and
then moves from PD to HD to PDel within-group dynamics as r increases. In contrast, we see how
a second PD game first experiences a transition to HD within-group dynamics, then between-group
dynamics favoring full-cooperation, followed finally by a transition to PDel within-group dynamics as
r is increased.
Figure 3.2: Illustration of regimes for within-group and between-group competition for various costs c and
synergies d, with b fixed to 2.5 (left) and 1.75 (right). Markers correspond to transformed cost cr and synergy
dr for various values of r ∈ { j10}j=0,···,10. Blue circles correspond to games with intermediate group payoff
optimum, while green squares correspond to games in which full-cooperator groups maximize collective payoff.
Original game with r = 0 is located at (c, d) = (1,−1) (left) and (c, d) = (0.25,−1) (right), while the transformed
payoff with r = 1 is given by (c, d) = (−0.5, 0) for both underlying games.
From the individual and group payoff functions, we can calculate that pirD(1) − pirC(1) = r(γ −
β) + β + α and that Gr(1) = γ + α. Using these expressions and Equation 2.18, we can find that the
average payoff at steady state is
〈Gr(·)〉f(x) = γ + α+
(α+ β + r (γ − β)) θ
λ
We can compute that
∂〈Gr(·)〉f(x)
∂r
=
θ
λ
(γ − β) = θ
λ
[T − P ] > 0,
so the average payoff at steady state is increasing as assortment increases. We can similarly use
Equation 2.17 to find that the minimum relevant selection strength to achieve cooperation is
λ∗r =
[− (β + α) + (β − γ) r] θ
γ + α
We compute that
∂λ∗r
∂r
=
(β − γ) θ
γ + α
=
(P − T ) θ
R− P < 0,
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and we see that we decrease the threshold of between-group selection intensity as assortment decreases.
Now we can take a look at the steady state densities under multilevel selection with game-
theoretic interactions featuring assortment with probability r. In Figure 3.3 for various assortment
probabilities r and a fixed initial condition and relative selection strength λ. We choose the game
parameters γ = 32 and α = 1, and can depict two scenarios by a choice of two different values of β. β =
−1 shown in 3.3(top) corresponds to the case in which rB < rsW and between-group selection begins to
most favor full-cooperation at levels of assortment below those needed to bring about some cooperation
through within-group selection alone. The choice β = −14 shown in 3.3(bottom) corresponds to the case
in which rB > rsW , and within-group selection can promote some cooperation at levels of assortment
for which between-group selection is still most favoring an intermediate level of cooperation. In both
cases, we see the densities support increasing levels of steady-state cooperation as r increases, and that
for the largest value of r depicted, the within-group dynamics now favor a stable mix of cooperation
depicted with a vertical dashed line with the same color as the corresponding density. Because we keep
the same relative selection strength λ as we increase the value of r, we are well above the threshold
selection strength λ∗r by the time we have reached within-group dynamics resembling the HD game,
and therefore the density concentrates near full-cooperation rather than the within-group equilibrium
in that case.
In Figure 3.4, we can plot the average payoff at steady-state for various values of λ and r. We
see that the threshold level of selection strength λ∗r needed to achieve cooperation is decreasing in r,
and that group payoff 〈Gr(·)〉fλθ is increasing in r for fixed values of λ. In particular, we see that a
substantial amount of the gains in sustaining cooperation occur at levels of r well below rsW when
within-group selection would start to allow for some cooperation. This highlights the synergistic effect
of assortative interactions on helping to improve group-level outcomes in addition to being individually
advantageous for payoff. In Figure 3.5, we show a similar heatmap for a PD game with α > 0, for
which assortment promotes bistability of full-cooperation and full-defection rather than coexistence of
the two strategies for intermediate levels of r. Dynamics of this type are addressed in more detail in
the discussion of the reciprocity models.
In Figure 3.6, we provide a comparison between the highest payoff group x∗r with the average
payoff of steady state for a fixed finite value of λ, showing how this discrepancy varies as a function of r.
In the top panel we depict a case in which rB < rsW , while in the bottom panel we depict the opposite
case in which rB > rsW . For the first case, we see that defection dominates for r near 0 and we require
r > 0.1 to achieve a positive average payoff at steady state, while in the bottom panel our choice of λ
is sufficient to feature cooperation at steady state even when r = 0. As r is increased, the steady state
average payoffs increases until it reaches the payoff of the full-cooperation group at r = raW = 0.8, the
level of assortment at which full-cooperation is produced by individual-level selection alone.
We can also consider the composition of group with greatest abundance at steady state, using
the formulas considered in Proposition 2.1. In Figure 3.7, we show a comparison between the group
type with maximal average payoff x∗r and the group type that is most abundant at steady state for a
fixed value of λ, plotted as a function of the assortment probability r. In Figure 3.8, we make the same
comparison, but this time consider the modal group type at steady state in the limit as λ → ∞. For
the finite λ case, we see that the modal group type reaches full-cooperation as r = raW and the within-
group dynamics themselves favor full-cooperation. In the case of infinite λ, we see that the modal
group type at steady state features fewer cooperators than in the optimal group x∗r when r < rB, and
then the optimal group and modal group as λ → ∞ coincide at full-cooperation when r > rB. In a
sense, we can think of having assortment at the level r > rB serves to erase the shadow of lower-level
selection cast under the dynamics of multilevel selection for the underlying game played in groups with
well-mixed interactions.
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Figure 3.3: Steady state densities for λ = 10, γ = 1.5, α = β = −1 (top) and various values of the assortment
parameter r. For λ = 3, γ = 1.5, β = −1, and α = −0.25. Vertical dotted lines correspond to the equilibrium
for within-group dynamics for the value of r whose corresponding steady state is displayed in the same color.
Figure 3.4: Heatmap of average payoff at steady state 〈Gr(·)〉fλθ 〉 for various values of λ and r. Other
parameters fixed as γ = 1.5, α = β = −1, and θ = 2. The left dashed gray line refers to rsW and the right
dashed gray line refers to raW . The multilevel HD regime occurs for values of r between these two bounds, and
we observe that the threshold λ∗∗r needed to achieve cooperation vanishes in the limit that r → raW .
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Figure 3.5: Heatmap of average payoff at steady state 〈Gr(·)〉fλθ 〉 for various values of λ and r. Dashed gray
line corresponds to level of assortment probability r such that cooperation becomes the globally stable outcome
within-groups. Other parameters fixed as γ = 1.5, α = 1, β = −4, and θ = 2.
Figure 3.6: Maximal group payoff Gr(x∗) (blue) and average payoff at steady state 〈Gr(·)〉fλθ (green) for
various assortment parameters r and a fixed value of λ = 7. Parameters for game and initial condition are
γ = 32 , α = −1, and θ = −1 for both images, while we choose different values of β as β = −1 (top) and
β = − 14 . Vertical dotted lines correspond to the equilibrium for within-group dynamics for the value of r whose
corresponding steady state is displayed in the same color.
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Figure 3.7: Group composition with maximal payoff x∗ (blue) and group type that is most abundant at steady
state for fixed relative strength of between-group selection λ = 8, plotted for various values of the assortment
parameter r. Parameters for game and initial condition are γ = 32 , α = −1, and θ = −1 for both images, while
we choose different values of β as β = −1 (top) and β = − 14 . Vertical dotted lines correspond to the equilibrium
for within-group dynamics for the value of r whose corresponding steady state is displayed in the same color.
Figure 3.8: Group composition with maximal payoff x∗ (blue) and group type that is most abundant at steady
state (green) in the limit as λ → ∞, plotted for various values of the assortment parameter r.Parameters for
game and initial condition are γ = 32 , α = −1, and θ = −1 for both images, while we choose different values of
β as β = −1 (top) and β = − 14 . Vertical dotted lines correspond to the equilibrium for within-group dynamics
for the value of r whose corresponding steady state is displayed in the same color.
4 Indirect Reciprocity
Now we turn to analyzing interactions with reciprocity mechanisms, which punish defectors for their
reputation of bad behavior and can help to stabilize populations with an established social norm
of cooperation. As a first example of reciprocity mechanism, we consider a model of Nowak and
Sigmund for social interactions with indirect reciprocity in which cooperators sometimes detect that
their opponent is a defector and punish them for their defector status [36]. This can be seen as a
distinct mechanism from direct reciprocity in repeated games, which we address in Section 5, because
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individuals are not necessarily punishing defectors for a transgression in a past interaction between the
two players, but because the defector has defected against someone in the population at all. While we
can incorporate more mechanistic descriptions of reputation effects [48, 49], the model of Nowak and
Sigmund is particularly tractible to include within our multilevel selection framework.
As in Nowak and Sigmund, we assume, when a cooperator interacts with a defector, that they
recognize the defector with probability q and punsish them with defection, while with probability 1−q,
they do not recognize the defector and choose to cooperate. Using these rules, we see that cooperators
and defectors have the following expected payoffs
piqC(x) = xR+ (1− x) (qP + (1− q)S) (4.1a)
piqD(x) = x (qP + (1− q)T ) + (1− x)P (4.1b)
For this process, it can also be helpful to view the detection probability q and the expected payoffs in
terms of a transformed payoff matrix
C D( )
C R (1− q)S + qP
D (1− q)T + qP P (4.2)
We can rearrange the payoffs of Equation 4.1 to write them as perturbations of the payoffs from
well-mixed interactions as
piqC(x) = xR+ (1− x)S + q(1− x)(P − S) = piC(x)− q(1− x)(P − S)
piqD(x) = xT + (1− x)P − qx(T − P ) = piD(x)− qx(T − P ),
We can also rewrite the payoffs in the following form
piqC(x) = (1− q)piC(x) + q(γ + α) + qP (4.3a)
piqD(x) = (1− q)piD(x) + qP, (4.3b)
and we can use these payoffs to see that the within-group replicator dynamics are given by
dx(t)
dt
= x(1− x) [piqC(x)− piqD(x)] = x(1− x) [(1− q)β + (α+ qγ)x] (4.4)
The within-group dynamics have equilibria at 0, 1, and a third point xeqq satisfying piqC(x
eq)
q = pi
q
D(x
eq
q ).
Using Equation 4.4, we see that this third equilbrium is given by
xeqq = −
(1− q)β
α+ qγ
Then we see that xeqq < 0 for q < −αγ and x
eq
q > 0 for q > −αγ . Further noticing that x
eq
q ≤ 1
when q ≤ −(β+α)γ−β ∈ (0, 1). Analyzing the stability of the equlibria 0, 1, and xeqq , we verify that 0
and 1 become bistable when xeqq decreases below 1. Therefore, achievement of cooperation through
within-group selection alone becomes possible when q increases above the threshold value
qWG =
− (β + α)
γ − β (4.5)
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Average payoff in a group with fraction x cooperators is given by
Gq(x) = x [piC(x) + q(1− x)(P − S)] + (1− x) [piD(x)− qx(T − P )]
= G(x) + qx [2P − S − T ] + qx2 [S + T − 2P ] .
We can also write the group payoff in terms of q and the game parameters α and γ as
Gq(x) = P + (1− q) γx+ (α+ qγ)x2, (4.6)
where we see that Gq(x) interpolates between the well-mixed group payoff function G0(x) = P + γx+
αx2 = G(x) (with corresponding intermediate payoff optimum when γ + 2α < 0) when q = 0 to a
payoff function G1(x) = P + (γ + α)x2 increasing on all of [0, 1] when q = 1. We observe that Gq(x)
has a critical point at x∗q =
(1−q)γ
−2(α+qγ) , which is a local maximum when α + qγ < 0 or when q <
−α
γ .
Further, this critical point is biologically feasible when x∗q ≤ 1, or when q < −2αγ − 1 ∈ (0, 1) for the
Prisoners’ Dilemmas with intermediate fitness optima satisfying x∗ = γ−2α ∈ (12 , 1). Because the group
type maximizing average payoff is 1 when x∗q > 1, we see that the group type maximizing average
payoff can be expressed as
x∗q = min
(
(1− q)γ
−2 (α+ qγ) , 1
)
(4.7)
When x∗q is in the interior, we can compute its derivative with respect to q to see that
∂x∗q
∂q
=
2γ
(α+ qγ)2
[γ + α] > 0, (4.8)
and therefore the group composition maximizing average payoff increases with q until reaching full-
cooperation. We can also compute the average payoff of the population at the interior optimum x∗q ,
which is given by
Gq(x
∗
q) = (1− q) γ
(
(1− q)γ
−2 (α+ qγ)
)
+ (α+ qγ)
(
(1− q)γ
−2 (α+ qγ)
)2
= −(1− q)
2γ2
4(α+ qγ)
. (4.9)
We further see that Gq(x∗q) is a decreasing function of q by computing
∂Gq(x
∗
q)
∂q
=
γ2(1− q)
4(α+ qγ)2
[γ(1− q) + 2α] < 0, (4.10)
where the inequality holds because we are considering the case in which x∗<1, and then we can apply
Equation 4.7 to see that enforces the constraint that (1−q)γ < −2(α+qγ), and consequently (1+q)γ <
−2α. Therefore we see that the maximal possible group payoff under our indirect reciprocity model
actually decreases until the highest payoff group becomes the full-cooperator group. Our subsequent
analysis of the multilevel dynamics will show that this decrease in maximal possible payoff does not
actually have an appreciable effect on the level of cooperation or collective payoff achieved as we
increase the detection probability q.
We would also like to characterize the shift in regimes from group payoff most favoring interme-
diate levels of cooperation to to group payoff most favoring the full-cooperator group. We denote that
the level of detection probability at which group average payoff is maximized at full cooperation by
qBG =
−2α
γ
− 1 (4.11)
21
From analyzing the within-group dynamics and the group average payoff, we have defined two
threshold quantities, qWG and qBG, describing respectively the detection probabilities needed to pro-
mote cooperation via within-group selection and for full-cooperator groups to have highest average
payoff. Now, we observe that qBG ≤ qWG, so that the alignment of group average payoff to support
full cooperation happens at lower detection probabilities than the probability of detection neeed to
achieve cooperation by within-group selection alone. To see this, we instead suppose that qWG < qBG,
and use Equations 4.5 and 4.11 to see that this is equivalent to
−(β + α)
γ − β <
−(2α+ γ)
γ
⇐⇒ γ2 + αγ < 2βγ + 2βα⇐⇒ β > γ
2
> 0,
which contradicts the fact that β < 0 for the Prisoners’ Dilemma. As a consequence, it is not possible
to both have locally stable full-cooperation due to within-group selection and a group-level competition
favoring a group with a mix of cooperators and defectors over full-cooperator groups. Once we have
enough detection to achieve cooperation within-group for some initial group compositions, we already
also have that the fastest reproducing groups are full-cooperator groups.
From the above properties of individual and collective payoff functions piqC(x), pi
q
D(x), and Gq(x),
we are able to illustrate in Figure 4.1 the generic bifurcation for the two-level q-process dynamics for
the PD with intermediate group payoff optimum. In particular, we see as q increases that optimal
group composition x∗q increases to 1 as q increases to qBG, while within-group dynamics still favor
full-defection in this regime and the multilevel dynamics still resemble the PD. Then, as q increases
past qWG, the unstable equilibrium x
eq
q appears, allowing for the bistability of full-cooperation and full-
defection under the within-group dynamics and moving the multilevel dynamics into the SH regime.
As q further increases to 1, the basin of attraction of the full-cooperator equilibrium expands to all
possible within-group states and the multilevel dynamics resemble the PDel game.
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Figure 4.1: Bifurcation diagram for within-group replicator dynamics and group type with maximal average
payoff for indirect reciprocity model. Green line describes group type x∗q with maximal average payoff of
group members Gq(x). Solid blue lines describe stable equilibria of within-group dynamics, while dashed blue
lines correspond to unstable equilibria. The leftmost dot-dashed gray line corresponds to qBG, the detection
probability above which group payoff Gq(x) is best off with full cooperation, and the rightmost gray line
corresponds to qWG, the detection probability above which full-cooperation is locally stable within groups.
We can further understand the content of the above bifurcation diagram by rewriting the trans-
formed payoffs of Equation 4.2 in terms of the benefit-cost-synergy formulation of our social dilemmas.
Under this parameterization, the payoffs of cooperators and defectors are transformed under the q-
reciprocity process to take the form
C D( )
C b− c+ d − (1− q) c
D (1− q)b 0 . (4.12)
We can further think of the transformed benefits, costs, and synergies in terms of the expressions
bq = (1− q)b (4.13a)
cq = (1− q)c (4.13b)
dq = (b− c) q + d. (4.13c)
Now that we see how cq and dq change with the defector detection probability q, we can reiterate
information from the bifurcation diagram from Figure 4.1 by showing how the payoffs move through
the different regimes for within-group dynamics and between-group competition as we vary q. In Figure
4.2, we illustrate this for the example games considered in the bifurcation diagram, showing how the
game first transitions between favoring intermediate cooperation to favoring full cooperation and then
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moves from PD to SH within-group dynamics as q is increased, before settling on the edge between
the PDel and SH at q = 1.
Figure 4.2: Illustration of regimes for within-group and between-group competition for various costs c and
synergies d, with b fixed to 2.5. Markers correspond to transformed cost cq and synergy dq for various values
of q ∈ { j10}j=0,···,10. Blue circles correspond to games with intermediate group payoff optimum, while green
squares correspond to games in which full-cooperator groups maximize collective payoff. Original game with
q = 0 is located at (c, d) = (1,−1), while the transformed payoff with q = 1 is given by (c, d) = (0, 0.5) for both
underlying games.
Using these formulas, we see that G(1) = γ+α and that piqD(1)−piqC(1) = − (β + α)− q (γ − β),
then when q < qWG and the multilevel dynamics are of the PD type, we see from Equation 2.17 that
the threshold level of relative selection strength needed to achieve cooperation is
λ∗q =
θ
γ + α
(− (β + α)− q (γ − β)) (4.14)
Further, we see that
λ∗q |q=qWG=−
(
β+α
γ−β
)= θ
γ + α
[
−(β + α)−
(−(β + α)
γ − β
)
(γ − β)
]
= 0,
so the relative level of between-group competition needed to achieve any cooperation decreases to 0
in the limit as q → qWG in which within-group selection is sufficient to sustain cooperation through
within-group selection alone.
We notice that ∂λ
∗
q
∂q = − θ(γ−β)γ+α < 0, so the threshold level of selection intensity needed to
obtain any cooperation decreases as the recognition probability q increases. Using our formulas for
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piqD(1)− piqC(1) and Gq(1), we can use Equation 2.18 to see that the average payoff at the steady state
density is
〈Gq(·)〉f(x) = γ + α+
(α+ β + q (γ − β)) θ
λ
and we have
∂〈Gr(·)〉f(x)
∂r
=
θ
λ
(γ − β) = θ
λ
[T − P ] > 0
so the average payoff at steady state is increasing as the probability of detecting defectors. Further, we
see that as q → qWG = −α+βγ−β that 〈Gq(·)〉fλθ (x) = γ+α = G(1), in agreement with the observation that
the multilevel dynamics are in the SH regime when q > qWG and the population should concentrate
at the full-cooperator equilibrium.
In Figure 4.3, we illustrate the impact of introducing indirect reciprocity and increasing the
defector detection probability q on the steady-state densities of the multilevel dynamics for a fixed initial
condition and relative strength of selection λ. The leftmost and lightest-colored curve corresponds to
within-group PD interactions without detection and punishment of defectors (q = 0), for which our
value of λ is only slightly over the threshold level λ∗PD needed to produce a steady state density
supporting some cooperation. As we increase the parameter q, the steady-state densities with darker-
colored curves show increased support for cooperation, with almost all groups consisting mostly of
cooperators by the time q = 0.625.
Figure 4.3: Steady state densities for λ = 10, γ = 1.5, θ = 2, α = β = −1 and various values of the defector
detection probability q.
In Figure 4.4, we illustrate the average payoff at steady state as a heatmap depending on the
detection probability q and the relative selection strength λ. The figure shows that increasing q
decreases the threshold λ∗q needed to achieve cooperation (and therefore nonzero steady state payoff)
and increases the average payoff 〈Gq(·)〉fλθ 〉. The gray dashed line indicates the point δWG at which we
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transition from the PD regime to the SH regime (in which full-cooperation is achieved by any positive
λ).
Figure 4.4: Heatmap of average payoff at steady state fitness 〈Gq(·)〉fλθ 〉 for various values of λ and q. Other
parameters chosen as γ = 1.5, α = β = −1, θ = 2. The gray dashed line corresponds to qWG, the point above
which the full-cooperator equilibrium is locally stable.
In Figure 4.5, we show a comparison between the average payoff of the group type with maximal
payoff Gr(x∗r) and the average payoff of the population at steady state 〈Gr(·)〉fλθ for various defector
detection probabilities q and a fixed value of relative selection strength λ. As noted in Equation 4.10,
the maximal possible payoff of the population decreases with q until reaching the average payoff of
the full-cooperation group, however we still see that the average payoff of the population at steady
state is non-decreasing in q. For our chosen payoff parameters of the underlying game and our choice
of λ, the full-defector group takes over the population for values of q less than around 0.15 and the
average payoff of the population takes on its minimal value. Then cooperation persists at steady state
for larger values of q and the average payoff increase with q until leveling off at Gq(1) when q = 0.8
and full-cooperation becomes locally stable within-groups, transitioning us into the Stag-Hunt regime
in which any level of between-group selection fixes full-cooperation in the population.
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Figure 4.5: Maximal group payoff Gq(x∗) (blue) and average payoff at steady state 〈Gq(·)〉fλθ (green) for various
values of the defector detection probability q and a fixed value of λ = 7. The gray dashed line corresponds to
qWG, the point above which the full-cooperator equilibrium is locally stable.
In Figure 4.6, we show a comparison between the group type x∗q which maximizes average payoff
Gq(x) to the group type which is most abundant in steady state as characterized by Proposition
2.1 for various defector detection probabilities q and a fixed value of λ. We see that for our choice
of payoff parameters and λ that we require q ≈ 0.25 to achieve a positive level of cooperation as
the modal outcome at steady state, and that this most abundant group composition then increases
with greater detection probability q before reaching full-cooperation at q = 0.8, the point at which
the full-cooperator group becomes locally stable under the within-group replicator dynamics with
indirect reciprocity. We make a similar plot in Figure 4.7, but this time the modal steady state group
composition we depict is for the limit as λ → ∞. Here we see that the most abundant group type as
λ → ∞ agrees with the optimal group type x∗q whenever the optimum features full-cooperation, and
that otherwise there are fewer cooperators than optimal in the modal group type even as λ→∞. By
including the effects of indirect reciprocity, we see that detection probabilities of at least 30 percent
can, in a sense, eliminate the shadow cast by lower-level selection in the multilevel dynamics governed
by the original payoff matrix.
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Figure 4.6: Group composition with maximal payoff x∗ (blue) and group type that is most abundant at steady
state (green) for fixed strength of between-group competition λ = 7, plotted for various values of the defector
detection probability q.
Figure 4.7: Group composition with maximal payoff x∗ (blue) and group type that is most abundant at steady
state (green) in the limit as λ→∞, plotted for various values of the defector detection probability q.
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5 Multilevel Selection in a Repeated Game
The deterministic evolutionary dynamics of strategies in the repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma was explored
by Imhof et al, who demonstrated that cylces and stable fixed points can be achieved under the
replicator dynamics in a single group with players of always cooperate (All-C), always defect (All-D)
and tit-for-tat (TFT) [50]. In this section, we will analyze the multilevel dynamics for Equation 2.13
for which strategic interactions consist of a repeated PD and the population is composed of individuals
playing All-D and either TFT or a the strategy Grim-Trigger (GRIM).
The GRIM strategy specifies that a player cooperates in the first round, and then continues to
cooperate until their opponent defects against them, after which the player will punish their opponent
by defecting thereafter. A TFT player cooperates in the first round and reciprocates their opponent’s
action from the previous round in all subsequent rounds. When playing against an opponent with the
same strategy, both a TFT and GRIM player will always cooperate because they and their opponent
start the first round by cooperating and reciprocate with cooperation in all previous rounds. When
playing against an All-D player, both a TFT and GRIM player will cooperate in the first round, and
then punish their opponent with defection in all subsequent rounds. Because the payoffs will be the
same if we consider a population of TFT and All-D players or a population of GRIM and All-D players,
we will stick to the name TFT for convenience.
We will denote by x the fraction of TFT strategists in a group, where the remaining fraction
1− x of group members play All-D. If the discount rate for a time-step, or alternately the probability
of termination of the repeated game, is δ, then the expected payoff for pariswise interactions in a
population of TFT and All-D players follow the payoff matrix
TFT All-D TFT R1− δ S + δP1− δ
All-D T +
δP
1− δ
P
1− δ
(5.1)
where these expected payoffs come from the rule that TFT players cooperate until they meet a first
defection from a defector. Then, the expected payoffs to TFT and All-D players in a group composed
of fraction x TFT players are
piδC(x) = x
1
1− δR+ (1− x)
(
S +
δ
1− δP
)
piδD(x) = x
(
T +
1
1− δP
)
+ (1− x) 1
1− δP
In terms of the original PD payoff matrix, we can rewrite the payoffs as
piδC(x) = piC(x) +
δ
1− δ (xR+ (1− x)P ) (5.2a)
piδD(x) = piD(x) +
δ
1− δP (5.2b)
This means that the payoff difference between TFT players and All-D players in an x cooperator group
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is
piδC(x)− piδD(x) = piC(x)− piD(x) +
δ
1− δ (R− P )x = β +
[(
1
1− δ
)
α+
(
δ
1− δ
)
γ
]
x (5.3)
Then we have that the within-group replicator dynamics are given by
dx(t)
dt
= x (1− x)
{
β +
[(
1
1− δ
)
α+
(
δ
1− δ
)
γ
]
x
}
(5.4)
and we see that the defector’s advantage in a full cooperator groups is given by
piδD(1)− piδC(1) = −β −
[(
1
1−δ
)
α+
(
δ
1−δ
)
γ
]
(5.5)
From here we see that a defector in an otherwise full-cooperator group has a payoff advantage over its
peer cooperators when
δ < δW :=
−(α+ β)
γ − β , (5.6)
while the cooperators have greater payoff than that defector when δ < δW . In particular, this means
that the fixed point at x = 1 will be locally unstable for δ > δW and locally stable for δ > δW .
For our repeated games with a given discount rate δ, the average payoff of group members is
given by
Gδ(x) = xpi
δ
C(x) + (1− x)piδD(x) (5.7)
=
(
1
1− δ
)
(xpiC(x) + (1− x)piD(x)) +
(
δ
1− δ
)(
P + (R− P )x2) (5.8)
and this can be simplified, in terms of our parameters γ, α, and β, as
Gδ(x) = P + γx+
(
α+
δ
1− δ (γ + α)
)
x2. (5.9)
We also find that the average payoff in a full-cooperator group is
Gδ(1) = γ + α+
(
δ
1− δ
)
(γ + α) =
(
1
1− δ
)
(γ + α) (5.10)
Using the quantities calculated above for individual and collective payoff functions piδC(x), pi
δ
D(x), and
Gδ(x), we are able to illustrate in Figure 5.1 the generic bifurcation for the two-level dynamics for the
repeated PD with intermediate group payoff optimum.
30
Figure 5.1: Bifurcation diagram for within-group replicator dynamics and group type with maximal average
payoff for direct reciprocity model. Qualitatively, this has the same behavior as the bifurcation diagram for
the indirect reciprocity model of Section 4. The green line represents the group type with maximal average
payoff x∗δ , the solid blue lines represent stable equilibria of the within-group dynamics, and the dashed blue lines
represent unstable equilibria. The dash-dotted gray lines represent δB (left) and δW (right), corresponding to the
threshold values of δ above which group payoff is maximized by full-cooperator groups and the full-cooperator
group becomes locally stable under the within-group dynamics, respectively.
As with the other mechanisms, we recover the well-mixed group payoff function as δ → 0, and we
find that Gδ(x) can become arbitrarily large as δ nears 1. Therefore, for sufficiently strong discounting,
we can make the benefit of full-cooperator groups as strong as we would like, enabling establishment
of cooperative density steady states for relatively lower relative selection strength λ.
When 0 ≤ δ < δW , the multilevel dynamics are in the PD regime, so we expect to see density
steady states of the form of Equation 2.16 when relative selection strength λ is sufficiently large. W
Then we can use the expressions from Equations 5.3 and 5.10 for the repeated game to find that the
average payoff of the population at steady state is
〈Gδ(·)〉f(x) = γ + α+
1
λ
[
β +
(
1
1−δ
)
α+
(
δ
1−δ
)
γ
]
(5.11)
Computing the partial derivative of average payoff with respect to δ
∂〈Gδ(·)〉f(x)
∂δ
=
(
γ + α
λ
)(
1
1− δ
)2
> 0,
we see that the fitness of the population is increased by additional discounting. Similarly, we can
calculate from Equation 2.17 that the threshold to establish cooperation through multilevel selection
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is given by
λ∗δ =
θ
γ + α
[
β +
(
1
1−δ
)
α+
(
δ
1−δ
)
γ
]
(5.12)
and we find that
∂λ∗δ
∂δ
= −θ
(
1
1− δ
)2
< 0
so the threshold for cooperation is decreasing in δ and cooperation is facilitated by additional discount-
ing.
In Figure 5.2, we illustrate the average payoff of the population at steady state for various values
of relative selection strength λ and discount factor δ. Unlike the previously studied mechanisms, we
see that higher values of average payoff are achieved for larger discount factors than for the average
payoff achieved in the large-payoff limit for the well-mixed game. We also illustrate the threshold level
of relative selection strength λ∗δ needed to sustain cooperation at steady state by the gray dashed line.
Figure 5.2: Average payoff of the population at steady state for various values of λ and δ in the multilevel
repeated PD dynamics. Downward sloping dotted gray line represents the threshold level of λ∗δ need to produce
cooperation for given discount factor δ.
As we see that discounting improves the maximal possible payoff achieved by groups, it is po-
tentially unfair to measure payoff for an entire repeated game in terms of the payoff matrix of the
one-shot stage game. Alternatively, we can consider the possibility of measuring the payoff of the
repeated game in the units of the stage game, using the notion of discounted average payoff [51]. We
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discount the realized payoffs of TFT and All-D players by a factor of 1− δ corresponding to counteract
the denominator 11−δ corresponding to the receipt of payoffs over the potentially infinite horizon of the
game. We can introduce the discounted average payoffs for the TFT/GRIM and ALL-D strategies as
p˜iC(x) := (1− δ)piC(x) and p˜iD(x) := (1− δ)piD(x). Using Equation 5.2, we can see that the discounted
average payoffs take the form
piδC(x) = (1− δ)piC(x) + δ (γ + α) + δP (5.13a)
piδD(x) = (1− δ)piD(x) + δP. (5.13b)
From these expressions, we see that the discounted average payoffs under direct reciprocity take the
same form as the payoffs piqc (x) and piqD(x) from Equation 4.3 from our model of indirect reciprocity
except with the discount factor δ taking the place of the defector detection probability q. Therefore we
see that multilevel selection for our repeated games with discounted average payoff for a given discount
factor δ will have the exact same long-time behavior as the same game under our indirect reciprocity
model with a detection probability q taking the same value as the discount factor.
Intuitively, this equivalence makes sense because both involve a fraction of events in which the
interaction between a defector and a conditional cooperator result in the standard S and T payoffs and
a complementary fraction in which the interaction represents a punishment defection by the conditional
cooperator that results in a payoff of P for each player. The mechanism for generating the analogous
weighted payoff is different, as the indirect reciprocity model involves averaging one’s payoffs across
interactions with different individuals, while the weighted average in the direct reciprocity model comes
from the expected fraction of interactions in the initial round and the subsequent punishment phase
when a TFT/GRIM player meets an All-D player. In future work, it will be interesting to explore
the extent to which direct and indirect reciprocity mechanisms display different behavior if we expand
the strategy space to include at least three interacting strategies, which will introduce higher-order
dilemmas that arise due to neutral invasions of strategies that agree along the equilibrium path but
are less robust to subsequent invasions [52–54].
6 Graph Structure within Groups
We can also study our multilevel selection process when the game-theoretic interactions and within-
group selection events take place on a k-regular graph, a random graph where each node has exactly k
edges. For within-group dynamics, these evolutionary games were studied by Ohtsuki and coauthors
[34, 35]. There are other ways to derive individual-level replicator equations arising from games played
on graphs such as those considered by Tarnita and coauthors [55, 56], Here, we focus on Ohtsuki’s
replicator equations for graphs in part because the equations have been associated with a new payoff
matrix whose well-mixed replicator dynamics agree with the realized dynamics for the graph-structured
population playing the original game. This payoff transformation is an example of the notion of an
“effective game” as characterized by Kaznatcheev [57], in which the transformed payoff matrix provides
a description of the resulting time trajectories for cooperation and defection under the replicator dy-
namics. The approach has proven useful for attempting to understand the game-theoretic interactions
taking place in cell-cultures for experiments on the dynamics of cancer [58] and virus [59] evolution.
Here we are interested in seeing how the effective payoff matrices obtained by Ohtsuki and coauthors
and the underlying microscopic interactions on the graph-structured population (“reductive games” as
described by Kaznatcheev) can impact the dynamics of multilevel selection when games are played on
k-regular graphs.
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Ohtsuki et al derived different versions of the replicator dynamics of graphs, corresponding to
the rules by which individuals updated their strategy. The processes studied included
• Death-Birth updating (DB): a random individual is chosen to die and its neighbors compete with
probability proportional to payoff to reproduce and replace their neighbor
• Birth-Death updating (BD): an individual is chosen to reproduce with probability proportional
to payoff, and their offspring replaces a randomly chosen neighbor.
• Imitation updating (IM): an individual is chosen at random to possibly revise their strategy, and
they pick either to imitate a neighbor’s strategy or retain their own strategy with probability
proportional to payoff
• Pairwise Comparison updating (PC): a random individual is chosen to reconsider their strategy
by comparing to a randomly chosen individual, and imitates their role model with probability
proportional to the difference in their payoffs [34, 35].
It was shown by Ohtsuki and Nowak that the PC rule had the same replicator equation as the BD
rule, and therefore they primarily considered the qualitative differences between the DB, BD, and IM
update rules [35]. They derived effective replicator equations for the changing fraction of cooperators
x in a population living on k-regular graphs, playing a cooperative dilemma with the payoff matrix
of Equation 2.1, and using one of the three update rules for strategy revisions. A main result of
that paper is the so-called “Ohtsuki-Nowak Transformation”, in which the effective individual-level
replicator equation for a given n-strategy game and update rule is shown to satisfy the well-mixed
replicator equation for a new payoff matrix. In the context of two-strategy social dilemmas with payoff
matrices as in Equation 2.1, the new payoff matrix takes the form
C D( )
C R S + bURk
D T − bURk P
, (6.1)
where bURk is the change in effective payoff or imitation rates received in a cooperator-defector interac-
tion for the given update rule UD ∈ {DB,BD, IM}. For the three update rules, the shifts in payoff
were given in Equation 2 of Ohtsuki and Nowak [35] by
bDBk =
(k + 1)R+ S − T − (k + 1)P
(k + 1) (k − 2) =
α+ 2β + k (γ + α)
(k + 1) (k − 2) (6.2a)
bBDk =
R+ S − T − P
k − 2 =
α+ 2β
k − 2 (6.2b)
bIMk =
(k + 3)R+ 3S − 3T − (k + 3)P
(k + 3)(k − 2) =
3 (α+ 2β) + k (γ + α)
(k + 3)(k − 2) (6.2c)
For any PD game, we know that
α+ 2β = R+ S − T − P = (R− T )︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
+ (S − P )︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
< 0,
and therefore the term proportional to α + 2β < 0 decreases the effective payoff of a cooperator and
increases the effective payoff of a defector when cooperators and defectors meet. Therefore, in the BD
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case, it turns out that the effective payoff matrix of Equation 6.1 hurts cooperation. For any PD game,
γ +α = R−P > 0, and therefore we know that the term proportional to γ +α in the payoff shift bURk
is beneficial to cooperators. Whether the update rule provides a beneficial shift to the cooperator or
defector in a cooperator-defector interaction depends on the graph’s degree k and the relative values
of the payoff parameters γ + α and α + 2β. Further, because k + 1 < k + 3 and α + 2β > 3(α + 2β),
we know that bDBk > b
IM
k , so the BD update rule is more conducive to favoring cooperation than the
IM update rule.
Using the well-mixed individual-level replicator equation for games with payoff matrices of the
form of Equation 6.1, the Ohtsuki-Nowak transformation tells us that the within-group replicator
equations on k-regular graphs for update rule UR are
dx(t)
dt
= x (1− x) (β + bURk + αx) (6.3)
which has the usual endpoint equilibria of 0 and 1, as well as the potentially interior equilibrium
xeqUR = −
(
β + bURk
α
)
. (6.4)
For convenience, we will often use the shorthand notation jURk = β + b
UR
k + αx to represent the rate
of birth or imitation of cooperators relative to defectors, with the corresponding differential equation
written as
dx(t)
dt
= x (1− x) jURk (x) (6.5)
In the well-mixed population, we know that the full-defector equilibrium x = 0 is globally stable
under the within-group dynamics, while the full-cooperator equilibrium is unstable under the within-
group dynamics. When game-theoretic interactions take place on a k-regular graph, the all-defector
equilibrium becomes unstable when jURk (0) > 0, and cooperators outperform defectors for reproduc-
tion/imitation in groups with few cooperators. The full-cooperator equilibrium becomes stable under
the within-group dynamics on graphs when jURk (1) > 0, and cooperators outperform defectors for
reproduction/imitation in groups with many cooperators. Furthermore, we can determine the possible
bifurcation behaviors by examining the relative values of jURk (0) and j
UR
k (1).
When α < 0, we know that β+α+bURk < β+b
UR
k and j
UR
k (0) > j
UR
k (1). This means that stability
of the full-cooperator equilibrium implies the instability of the full-defection equilibrium, so the possible
dynamical behaviors of within-group selection for any our update rules and α < 0 are dominance of
defectors, , dominance of cooperators, or coexistence of a stable mix of cooperators or defectors. If
instead α > 0, we see that β+α+bURk > β+b
UR
k and j
UR
k (0) < j
UR
k . This means that instability of the
full-defection equilibrium implies stability of the full-defector equilibrium, meaning that the possible
dynamical behaviors for α > 0 are dominance of defectors, dominance of cooperators, or bistability of
the full-cooperation and full-defection equilibria. In other words, the α < 0 case allows within-group
dynamics on graphs analogous to the well-mixed dynamics of a Prisoners’ Dilemma, Hawk-Dove game,
or Prisoners’ Delight, while the α > 0 case allows for within-group graph replicator equations with
well-mixed dynamics for the Prisoners’ Dilemma, Stag-Hunt game, or Prisoners’ Delight.
Now that we have discussed the within-group dynamics for interactions taking place on k-regular
graphs, we now need to consider the role that within-group graph structure plays in the competition
between groups due to the average payoff of group members. Notably, while the replicator dynamics
on graphs is equivalent for the replicator dynamics for the game with the appropriate Ohtsuki-Nowak
payoff transformation on a well-mixed population, we see that the total payoff generated by interactions
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following the payoff matrix in Equation 6.1 is 2R for two cooperators, 2P for two defectors, and S+T
for a cooperator and a defector, so the average payoff for a group playing a game on Equation 6.1 is
still equal to G(x) = P + γx + αx2, equal to the average payoff in a group for interactions following
the original payoff matrix 2.1. As a result, the payoff transformation doesn’t actually change average
payoff, but rather transfers payoff from defectors to cooperators when a cooperator and defector play
against each other. Because the transformed payoff matrix doesn’t reflect how average group payoff
changes when interactions occur on a k-regular graph, we must calculate average group payoff on these
graphs to study the dynamics of our multilevel selection process.
However, we can use some of the calculations from the pair approximations of Ohtsuki and coau-
thors [34, 35] to determine the average payoff obtained in a population with fraction x cooperators and
with individual-level selection on a k-regular graph following any of the update rules under consider-
ation. For a cooperator on such a regular k-graph, a cooperator and defector receive expected payoffs
of
pikC(x) = qC|CR+ qD|CS = (1− qD|C)R+ qD|CS (6.6a)
pikD(x) = qC|DT + qD|DP = qC|DT + (1− qC|D)P (6.6b)
where q(A|B) is the conditional probability that the neighbor of an B player is an A player. Using the
pair approximation of Ohtsuki et al [34, 35], the conditional probability of connections equilibrates to
qC|D =
(
k−2
k−1
)
x and qD|C =
(
k−2
k−1
)
(1− x) for all three of our update rules, which gives us
pikC(x) = R+
(
k−2
k−1
)
(S −R)(1− x) (6.7a)
pikD(x) = P +
(
k−2
k−1
)
(T − P )x (6.7b)
Remark 6.1. We note that the pair approximations for qC|D and qD|C and within-group dynamics
of Equation 6.3 derived by Ohtsuki and coauthors hold under certain weak-selection assumptions for
individual-level competition [34, 35], but we will consider the resulting within-group them in comparison
to between-group selection at a different level of selection, so we may need to also consider a sufficiently
weak intensity of between-group competition in order to have within-group and between-group competi-
tion operating on comparable time scales.
Because the expressions for individual payoff for cooperator and defectors in x-cooperator groups
agree across our three update rules, we will denote by Gk(x) the average payoff of group members in
an x-cooperator groups with within-group interactions and competition on a k-regular graph with any
our update rules. We can calculate this average payoff by computing Gk(x) = xpikC(x) + (1 − x)pikD,
and we find that this satisfies
Gk(x) = P +
(
k − 2
k − 1
)(
(S + T − 2P )x+ (R− S − T + P )x2)+ ( 1
k − 1
)
(R− P )x (6.8)
Noting that R − P = γ + α, so we can also write our group payoff function for k-regular graphs in
terms of our usual parameters
(6.9)
Gk(x) = P +
(
γ +
α
k − 1
)
x+
(
k − 2
k − 1
)
αx2
=
(
k − 2
k − 1
)(
P + γx+ αx2
)
+
(
1
k − 1
)
(P + (γ + α)x) .
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We observe from Equation 6.9 that Gk(x) is a convex combination of the well-mixed group
payoff function G(x) = P + γx+ αx2 for our two-player game and P + (R − P )x, a scaled version of
group-level payoff function in the frequency-independent Luo-Mattingly model. For k = 3, the group
function Gk(x) places 1/2 weight on (R−P )x and 1/2 weight on the well-mixed group payoff function,
while we recover the well-mixed group payoff function in the limit as k → ∞. Unlike in our models
for assortment and reciprocity, our model does not fully interpolate from the original group payoff
function from the well-mixed game-theoretic interactions following Equation 2.1 to a regime favoring
full-cooperation with collective payoff linearly proportional to the fraction of cooperators as we vary
our neighborhood size parameter k between the well-mixed limit as k → ∞ and the smallest possible
k-regular graph with k = 3. In particular, we still an equal weight placed upon the original group
payoff and the Luo-Mattingly group payoff function even in the sparsest graphs we consider, meaning
that the mechanism of including k-regular graph structure is not guaranteed to eliminate the possibility
of collective payoff being optimized by an intermediate mix of cooperators and defectors.
However, for many of our games of interest, placing interactions onto a sufficiently sparse k-
regular graph does shift the average payoff function Gk(X) to make the full-cooperator groups the
most competitive in between-group competition. We illustrate this through the following example,
consisting of a family of PD games previously studied because the well-mixed within-group dynamics
are exactly solvable [18].
Example 6.2. For γ ∈ [32 , 2), α = −1, we see that
G′k(x) = γ −
1
k − 1 − 2
(
k − 2
k − 1
)
x = 0 when x =
γ(k − 1)
2(k − 2) −
1
2(k − 2)
So for k = 3, we see that G3(x) has its only critical point at γ − 12 ∈ [1, 32), so G3(x) is maximized at
x∗3 = 1. In the well-mixed limit, we see that limk→∞Gk(x) is maximized at x∗∞ =
γ
2 ∈ [34 , 1). Therefore
a game with such γ and α has average group payoff maximized at an interior fraction of cooperators
in (0, 1) with well-mixed interactions, but allowing interactions for the same game to take place on a
3-regular random graph allows average group payoff to be maximized with full cooperation. Notably,
the choice of k = 3 is required for the games with γ ∈ [32 , 53) and α = −1, as an intermediate payoff
optimum is achieved for 4-regular graphs when
G′4(1) = γ −
5
3
< 0 or γ <
5
3
.
What this example illustrates is that, for a two-player game for which the group average payoff
G(x) is maximized at an interior strategy x∗ ∈ (0, 1) for well-mixed groups, it is possible for average
group payoff to be maximized at x∗3 = 1 when within-group interactions occur on regular k graph for
k = 3. In other words, the presence of graph structure within groups can facilitate further promotion
of cooperation in selection at the between-group level. In particular, by increasing the point at which
average group payoff Gk(x) is maximized, decreasing the degree of social interactions k can facilitate
greater abundance of groups with large fractions of cooperators as λ→∞, and, in particular, choosing
small enough k can shift the multi-level selection dynamics from a regime where the most abundant
group type at steady state xˆkλ ∈ (0, 1) as λ → ∞ to one where full cooperation is the most abundant
group type in the large λ limit.
In fact, we can generalize the idea of Example 6.2 to understand how the number of neighbors k
impacts the shape of the group payoff function Gk(x) and the types of group that maximize collective
payoff in the setting of game-theoretic interactions taking place on k-regular graphs. In Lemma 6.3, we
show, for any PD game with intermediate group payoff optimum x∗ < 1 under well-mixed interactions,
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that the maximizer of average payoff of group members x∗k is a decreasing function of k. We also derive
threshold quantities for the number of neighbors required to produce a group payoff function Gk(x)
maximized at full-cooperation in terms of x∗.
Lemma 6.3. Consider a PD game with intermediate group payoff optimum x∗ := γ−2α . Then the
group composition x∗k which maximizes the collective payoff Gk(x) for interactions on a k-regular graph
is given by
x∗k = min
{(
1
k − 2
)[
(k − 1)x∗ − 1
2
]
, 1
}
. (6.10)
Furthermore, this expression is a decreasing function of k when x∗k < 1, and we know that the full-
cooperator group maximizes group payoff Gk(x) for sufficently neighborhood sizes
k ≤ 3− 2x
∗
2 (1− x∗) .
Additionally, we know that there is actually a neighborhood size k ∈ Zk≥3 such that Gk(x) is maximized
by full-cooperation when x∗ ≥ 34 , and consequently γ ≥ −3α4 .
Proof. We can start by differentiating the group payoff function G′k(x), and finding the critical point
at which
G′k(x) = γ +
α
k − 1 + 2
(
k − 2
k − 1
)
αx = 0,
which is satisfied for(
k − 2
k − 1
)
x =
γ
−2α −
1
2(k − 1) =⇒ x =
(
1
k − 2
)[
(k − 1)x∗ − 1
2
]
Because Gk(x) is concave, we know that this critical point maximizes group payoff when it is feasible,
and otherwise Gk(x) will increase on [0, 1] until reaching an endpoint maximum at 1. Combining these
cases yields the piecewise expression for the group optimum x∗k of Equation 6.10. Furthermore, the
critical point falls outside the interior of feasible population states in [0, 1] when
(k − 1)x∗ − 1
2
≥ k − 2 or when k ≤ 3− 2x
∗
2(1− x∗) ,
so those are the cases in which x∗k = 1 and full-cooperation has the highest collective payoff for
interactions on a k-regular graph. There will be a feasible number of neighbors k ≥ 3 for which
full-cooperation is collectively optimal when
3 ≤ 3− 2x
∗
2(1− x∗) =⇒ x
∗ ≥ 3
4
When x∗ < 1, we can differentiate our expression for x∗ with respect to k to see that
∂x∗k
∂k
=
(
1
(k − 2)2
)[
1
2
− x∗
]
< 0
where the inequality follows from the fact that γ + α = R − P > 0 for the PD game, and therefore
γ > −α and x∗ := γ−2α > 12 . From this calculation, we see that interior group optima x∗ increase in
their level of cooperation as the number of neighbors k decreases, so sparsity of graphs begets a greater
importance of higher levels of cooperation.
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Now that we have characterized the within-group birth-death dynamics and the average payoff
of group members for games played on k-regular graphs, we can now define our multilevel dynamics
by coupling within-group and between-group competition. We can describe a multilevel selection
process with groups having within-group interaction on k-regular graphs with an update rule UR ∈
{DB,BD, IM} using the following PDE
(6.11)
∂f(t, x)
∂t
= − ∂
∂x
[
x(1− x)jUDk (x)f(t, x)
]
+ λf(t, x)
[
Gk(x)− 〈G(·)〉f(t,·)
]
.
We can also describe these multilevel selection more explicitly in terms of our graph and payoff param-
eters in the following form
(6.12)
∂f(t, x)
∂t
= − ∂
∂x
[
x(1− x) (β + bUDk + αx) f(t, x)]
+ λf(t, x)
{(
γ + αk−1
)
x+
(
k−2
k−1
)
αx2 −
[(
γ + αk−1
)
Mf1 +
(
k−2
k−1
)
αMf2
]}
.
A distinction from the multilevel dynamics of Equation 2.13 defined in terms of our payoff func-
tions with the structure parameter ς is that the within-group birth and death dynamics are governed
by the net flux of cooperators and defectors jURk (x) derived from the Ohtsuki-Nowak transformation,
rather than the defector’s advantage pikD(x) − pikC(x). At the end of the day, we are able to under-
stand formulas in Section 2.1 that characterize the steady-state behavior of the population by simply
plugging in jURk (x) anywhere we see pi
ς
C(x)− piςD(x), but it is helpful to reiterate them in terms of our
notation for multilevel selection with interactions on graphs. In particular, we can see from Equation
2.17 the threshold level of between-group competition intensity needed to achieve cooperation for a
given update rule when full-defection dominates within groups is given by
λ∗k,UR =
−jURk (1)θ
Gk(1)−Gk(0) (6.13)
and we can see from Equation 2.22 that the average payoff of the population at steady state is given
by
〈G(·)〉f∞(x) = Gk(1)
[
1− λ
∗
k,UR
λ
]
. (6.14)
When the full-defector equilibrium is unstable and the within-group dynamics resemble those
of a well-mixed HD game, and we use versions of Equation 2.21 and Equation 2.22 by replacing the
term for defector’s advantage in a many-cooperator group piςD(1)−piςC(1) with the net-flux of defectors
in a many-cooperator group −jURk (1). Then the threshold level of selection needed to achieve more
cooperation that the equilibrium level xeqk,UR is given by
λ∗∗k,UR =
−jURk (1)θ
Gk(1)−Gk(xeqk,UR
(6.15)
and the average payoff at density-steady states for λ ≥ λ∗k,UR is given by
〈G(·)〉f(·) = Gk(1)−
λ∗∗
λ
[
Gk(1)−Gk(λ∗k,UR)
]
(6.16)
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In the subsequent sub-sections, we will proceed to study the effects of k-regular graph structure
and the different update rules on the ability to support cooperation through within-group selection and
through multilevel selection. We will quantify the ability for graph dynamics to support cooperation
through inequalities for the payoff parameters x∗ = γ−2α and
β
α , with an emphasis on understanding
for which games can a given neighborhood size k and update rule help a population achieve greater
cooperation than is possible for well-mixed through individual and multilevel selection. We will discuss
death-birth updating in Section 6.1, birth-death updating in Section 6.2, and imitation updating in
Section 6.3.
6.1 Death-Birth Updating
For a given value of k, we can analyze the stability of equilibria for the within-group dynamics and the
threshold level of between-group selection λ∗k,DB using the values of the relative flux of cooperators in
the full-defector group and the full-cooperator group, jDBk (0) and j
DB
j (1). For the DB updating rule,
we will focus on PD games in which α < 0, including the subclass of PDs with intermediate payoff
optima (whose payoff matrices satisfy the further restriction that γ + 2α < 0). In Proposition 6.4, we
collect results on conditions on the payoff parameters x∗ := γ−2α and
β
α permitting the instability of the
full-defection equilibrium, the stability of the full-cooperation equilibrium, and a decreased threshold in
the intensity of between-group competition required to bring about cooperation relative to the within-
group selection. In particular, we find threshold levels the maximizer of the group payoff function x∗
to achieve these results beneficial to cooperation, which allows us to see whether graph reciprocity can
help to produce greater cooperation when the underlying game-theoretic optimum favors groups with
an intermediate level of cooperation.
Proposition 6.4. Consider PD games with α < 0 and within-group dynamics on a k-regular graph
with DB updating. For such games, there exist the threshold quantities
TDB0 (k) :=
k + 1
2k
+
(
k − 1
2
)
β
α
(6.17a)
TDB1 (k) :=
(k − 1)(k + 1)
2k
+
(
k − 1
2
)
β
α
(6.17b)
TDBλ∗ (k) :=
k + 1
2k
+
(
1
k
)
β
α
(6.17c)
such that the full-defector equilibrium is unstable when x∗ > TDB0 (k), the full-cooperator equilibrium
is table when x∗ > TDB1 (k), and multilevel selection is favored for k-regular graph interactions relative
to well-mixed interactions (i.e. λ∗k,DB < λ
∗
k→∞ :=
−(β+α)θ
γ+α ) when x
∗ > TDBλ∗ (k). Furthermore, these
threshold quantities satisfy the following ranking:
TDBλ∗ (k) ≤ TDB0 (k) ≤ TDB1 (k)
Remark 6.5. These threshold values illustrate two key differences between multilevel selection with
death-birth graph reciprocity and multilevel selection with our previous assortment and (in)direct reci-
procity mechanism. With those mechanisms, we saw that any PD game increasing the assortment or
punishment probabilities would always help decrease the threshold λ∗ς needed to produce increase co-
operation via multilevel selection. However, for DB updating, games satisfying x∗ < TDBλ∗ (k) actually
experienced an increased threshold λ∗k,DB relative to the threshold for well-mixed interactions. Addition-
ally, because we are considering PD games with α < 0 and graphs with k ≥ 3, we see that (k−1)(k+1)2k > 1
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and
(
k−1
2
) β
α > 0. This tells us that T
DB
1 (1) > 1, so consequently no game with intermediate optimum
x∗ < 1 can achieve local stability of the full-cooperator equilibrium. This means that, for such games,
the best within-group selection with DB updating can achieve is a coexistence of cooperators and defec-
tors. This stands in contrast to the behavior of the previous assortment and reciprocity mechanisms,
for which values of r, q, or δ sufficiently close to 1 will guarantee global stability of the full-cooperator
equilibrium under the within-group dynamics. In these two senses, graph reciprocity can be seen as a
weaker mechanism for promoting cooperation through individual and multilevel selection for games with
intermediate fitness optima.
Proof. We know that the full-defector equilibrium become unstable when
jDBk (0) = β +
α+ 2β + k(γ + α)
(k + 1)(k − 2) > 0
Using the fact that α < 0, we can rearrange this inequality to find that
x∗ :=
γ
−2α >
k + 1
2
+
(
k − 1
2
)
β
α
. (6.18a)
We can similarly derive the condition for stability of the full-cooperator equilibrium by knowing that
it is stable when
jDBk (1) = β + α+
α+ 2β + k(γ + α)
(k + 1)(k − 2) > 0
and rearranging to find that
x∗ :=
γ
−2α >
(k − 1)(k + 1)
2k
+
(
k − 1
2
)
β
α
(6.18b)
To determine whether the threshold λ∗k,DB to achieve steady state cooperation under multilevel selection
is less than the threshold for multilevel selection in populations with well-mixed interactions, we can
use Equation 6.13 and our expression for λ∗ to see that this requires
−jDBk (1)θ
Gk(1)−Gk(0) <
− (β + α) θ
G(1)−G(0)
Noting that Gk(1) = γ + α = G(1) and Gk(0) = 0 = G(0), we see that it now suffices to show that
jDBk (1) := β + α+
α+ 2β + k(γ + α)
(k + 1)(k − 2) > β + α,
and furthermore that this reduces to showing that
α+ 2β + k(γ + α)
(k + 1)(k − 2) > 0.
Finally, we can rearrange this inequality to show that λ∗k,DB < λ
∗ when
x∗ :=
γ
−2α >
k + 1
2
+
(
1
k
)
β
α
(6.18c)
Now we move on the the ranking of the thresholds. To show that TDBλ∗ (k) < T
DB
1 (k), we use the fact
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that α, β < 0 and k ≥ 3 to see that
TDB1 (k)− TDBλ∗ (k) =
(
k − 1
2
− 1
k
)
β
α
=
(
(k − 2) (k + 1)
2k
)
β
α
> 0
Similarly, to show that TDB1 (k) > TDBλ∗ (k), we use that α, beta < 0 and that k ≥ 3 to see that
TDB1 (k)− TDBλ∗ (k) >
(k − 2)(k + 1)
2k
+
(
k − 1
2
− 1
k
)
β
α
> 0
We now illustrate some of the consequences of the threshold quantities we derived in Proposition
6.4. In Figure 6.1, we illustrate the regions of the payoff parameter space for which within-group and
between-group selection are hindered or favored by placing interactions on a 3-regular graph relative
to well-mixed interactions. From the thresholds in Equation 6.17, we are able to characterize these
different qualitative regimes through the parameters x∗ = γ−2α and
β
α . Going from top to bottom, the
four regions depicted are
• games that do not satisfy the requirements to be a PD game (as x∗ < 12 so γ+α < 0 and R < P )
• games for which x∗ < TDBλ∗ (3), so within-group selection cannot produce cooperation and the
threshold to produce cooperation via multilevel selection is higher than the case of well-mixed
interactions
• games for which TDBλ∗ (3) < x∗ < TDB0 (3), so within-group selection can’t produce cooperation
on its own but the threshold is decreased for promotion cooperation via multilevel selection
• games for which x∗ > TDB0 (3), so cooperation is facilitated both for within-group selection and
for multilevel selection
Additionally, we notice that all three qualitative regimes for the PD game occupy some portion of the
parameter space in which x∗ < 1, so games with intermediate levels of cooperation can have individual
level selection be unhelped or helped and have multilevel selection helped or hurt by placing interactions
on a 3-regular graph.
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Figure 6.1: Regions of payoff parameter space in which multilevel selection and individual-level selection is
helped or harmed by placing interactions on a k-regular graph, relative to well-mixed social interactions. Payoff
matrices parametrized by values of group optimum x∗ and the ratio βα . Top panel provides a parameter regime
including both edge and intermediate group optima, while bottom panel focuses on the case of intermediate
group optima. IS and MS stand for individual-level selection and multilevel selection, respectively.
We further address the issue of threshold relative selection strength λ∗k,DB in Figure 6.2. Here
we plot this threshold quantity as a function of k for three different values of β (dots), and compare
these to the threshold selection levels for well-mixed interactions (dashed lines). For β = −1 (black
dots) and β = −12 , we see that there are sufficient small neighborhood sizes k for which the threshold
is increased by placing interactions on the k-regular graph, while for β = −15 we see that the threshold
quantities λ∗k,DB are less than the case of well-mixed interactions λ
∗
PD for all values of k ∈ Z≥3. For
all three cases, we see that there are intermediate values of k that minimize the threshold quantity
λ∗k,DB, telling us that intermediate sparsity of interactions can be most favorable for trying to establish
cooperation via multilevel selection for games with intermediate payoff optima x∗ < 1. Unsurprisingly,
we see that the thresholds λ∗k,DB approach the threshold of the well-mixed case λ
∗
PD in the limit at
k →∞.
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Figure 6.2: Threshold level of selection λ∗k,DB needed to achieve cooperation via multilevel selection as a
function of neighborhood size k. Threshold levels shown for β = −1 (black), β = − 12 , and β = − 15 , with other
parameters fixed as γ = 32 , α = −1, and θ = 2. The dashed horizontal lines corresponds to the threshold
λ∗ for multilevel selection for well-mixed interactions and within-group selection, with the color of the line
corresponding to the value of β for the dots of the same color. The vertical dashed line corresponds to the
minimum neighborhood size k = 3. For β = −1 and β = − 12 , there are sufficient sparse k-regular graphs such
that λ∗k exceeds the well-mixed threshold, while the threshold is decreases for all finite neighborhood sizes k
when β = − 15 .
In Figure 6.3, we compare the average payoff at steady state for multilevel selection with DB
updating on k-regular graphs (solid lines) with the baseline behavior of the model for the same game
with game-theoretic interactions in well-mixed groups (dashed lines). We consider graphs with k = 3
(top) and k = 5 (bottom) neighbors, and consider three different values of β in each case. For both
neighborhood sizes, we see that the game with β = − 110 falls within the regime for which x∗ > TDB0 (k),
resulting in some cooperation arising within-groups even for low-levels of cooperation (and the nonzero
average payoff for low λ) and improved average payoff on both k-regular graphs relative to the well-
mixed case. For β = −12 , we see that TDBλ∗ (4) < x∗ < TDBλ∗ (3), so average payoff is increased relative
to the well-mixed case when k = 4, but diminished when k = 3. For β = −1, x∗ < TDBλ∗ (3) and
x∗ < TDBλ∗ (4), so the average payoff at steady state is worse for interactions on both 3-regular and
4-regular graphs than in the well-mixed case, although the discrepancy is much less for the 4-regular
graph.
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Figure 6.3: Average payoff of the steady state population for various values of relative selection strength λ,
for game-theoretic interactions taking place on a k-regular graph (solid lines) or in a well-mixed group (dashed
lines). Number of neighbors on graph is k = 3 (top) or k = 5 (bottom), and the value of β varies between
β = −1 (black lines), β = − 12 (blue lines), and β = − 110 (red lines). Other parameters chosen to be γ = 32 ,
α = −1, α = −1, and θ = 2.
Although we have address than there are substantial portion of PD games for which the threshold
relative selection λ∗k,DB is greater than the threshold for the equivalent games with well-mixed inter-
actions, we also know from Lemma 6.3 that decreasing the number of neighbors k can help to favor
groups featuring greater fractions of cooperators. In fact, we can use Proposition 2.1 to show how the
graph structure k impacts the most abundant group type at steady state in the limit of large relative
selection strength λ → ∞. In Figure 6.4, we use our characterization of the optimal composition of
cooperators x∗k from Equation 6.10 and the characterization of the most abundant group type at steady
state in the large λ limit from Equation 2.23 to display the most-fit and modal group types at steady
state for various numbers of neighbors k. What we learn from this figure is that the modal and most
fit group types agree upon full-cooperation for k between 0 and 9, while the modal group type features
less cooperation than the optimal group once the optimal group type occurs at an intermediate level
of cooperation x∗k < 1 when k >= 10. As k grows larger, we see that the most-fit and modal group
type as λ → ∞ approach the corresponding quantities in the well-mixed case. We can think of the
behavior for k <= 9 as the role of placing interactions on a sparse enough graph on erasing the shadow
of lower-level selection that occurs for the underlying game with x∗ < 1 when interactions take place
within well-mixed groups.
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Figure 6.4: Comparison between group type with maximal payoff x∗k (blue) and most abundant group type
at steady state in the limit as relative selection strength λ → ∞ (green) for multilevel selection with the DB
update rule, plotted as a function of the number of graph neighbors k. The blue and dashed lines correspond
to the corresponding group type with maximal payoff and most abundant group composition at steady state
for well-mixed interactions (or the k → ∞ limit). For this example, we used γ = 3116 and α = −1. The gray
vertical dashed line corresponds to k = 9, the largest value of k for which group payoff Gk(x) is maximized by
the full-cooperator group for our choice of parameters.
6.2 Birth-Death Updating
For birth-death updating, Ohtsuki and Nowak showed that full-defection remained globally stable for
any k-regular graph for all of the games they considered [35]. In fact, one can show that this is true for
all PD games, and furthermore that the inclusion of graph-structured interactions with BD updating
increases the threshold relative selection strength needed to achieve cooperation via multilevel selection
relative to the case of well-mixed interactions. We determine the stability of within-group equilibria
by examining the values of the flux jBDk (x) at the endpoints x = 0 and x = 1. For the all-defector
equilibrium, we see that
jBDk (0) = β +
(
α+ 2β
k − 2
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
< 0
because β < 0 and α + 2β = R + S − T − P < 0 for all PD games, and that k ≥ 3 for the family of
k-regular graphs under consideration. This means that the all-defection equilibrium remains stable for
all k-regular graphs under birth-death updating. For the all-cooperator equilibrium, we see that
jBDk (1) = α+ β︸ ︷︷ ︸
=R−T<0
+
(
α+ 2β
k − 2
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
< 0,
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so the all-cooperator equilibrium is unstable for all k under the birth-death within-group dynamics.
Putting these two stability criteria together, we see that defection is dominant under the within-group
birth-death dynamics for any k-regular graph. This means that placing individual-level competition
on a k-regular graph with birth-death updating cannot help achieve cooperation on its own.
Furthermore, because the full-defection equilibrium is always stable under within-dynamics with
BD updating, we know that we can use Equation 6.13 to express the threshold relative selection
strength needed to produce density steady states supporting cooperation as
λ∗k,BD =
−jk,BDθ
Gk(1)−Gk(0) =
−
(
β + α+ α+2βk−2
)
θ
γ + α
>
− (β + α) θ
γ + α
=: λ∗PD.
λ∗PD is the threshold relative selection needed to support cooperation under well-mixed interactions
for PD games, and therefore we see that a greater intensity of between-group selection is needed to
facilitate cooperation via multilevel selection when interactions occur on k-regular graphs with the BD
update rule. We illustrate this increased difficulty of achieving cooperation by plotting the threshold
levels λ∗k,BD as a function of k in Figure 6.5, where we see that the thresholds decrease monotonically
as k increases from 3, approaching the thresholds for well-mixed interactions in the limit as k → ∞.
From these increased threshold levels, we see that BD updating does not promote cooperation at the
individual level, but even makes achieving cooperation more difficult when groups are able to compete
according to their collective payoffs.
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Figure 6.5: Threshold level of selection λ∗k,BD needed to achieve cooperation via multilevel selection as a
function of neighborhood size k. Threshold levels shown for β = −1 (black), β = − 12 , and β = − 15 , with other
parameters fixed as γ = 32 , α = −1, and θ = 2. The dashed horizontal lines corresponds to the threshold
λ∗ for multilevel selection for well-mixed interactions and within-group selection, with the color of the line
corresponding to the value of β for the dots of the same color. The vertical dashed line corresponds to the
minimum neighborhood size k = 3. For all values of β, the threshold is greater on any k-regular graph than for
multilevel-selection with well-mixed groups.
6.3 Imitation Updating
Now we discuss the dynamics of the IM update rule. This rule was shown in Ohtsuki and Nowak
to have similar qualitative behavior to the DB update rule for the individual-level for several games,
although having slightly weaker support for cooperation for a given game and neighborhood size k [35].
In Proposition 6.6, we establish the game parameters x∗ and βα for which within-group and multilevel
selection are more capable of producing cooperation with interactions on k-regular graphs with IM
updating relative to the well-mixed case. The result and proof are analogous to those of Proposition
6.4, as one can repeat similar steps by making appropriate use of net flux of cooperation at the endpoint
equilbria jIMk (0) and j
IM
k (1). As mentioned in Remark 6.5 for the DB update rule, the within-group
and multilevel dynamics for the IM rule differ
Proposition 6.6. Consider PD games with α < 0 and within-group dynamics on a k-regular graph
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with IM updating. For such games, there exist the threshold quantities
T IM0 (k) :=
k + 3
2k
+
(
k + 1
2
)
β
α
(6.19a)
T IM1 (k) :=
(k + 3)(k − 1)
2k
+
(
k + 1
2
)
β
α
(6.19b)
T IMλ∗ (k) :=
k + 3
2k
+
(
3
k
)
β
α
(6.19c)
such that the full-defector equilibrium is unstable when x∗ > T IM0 (k), the full-cooperator equilibrium
is table when x∗ > T IM1 (k), and multilevel selection is favored for k-regular graph interactions relative
to well-mixed interactions (i.e. λ∗k,IM < λ
∗
k→∞ :=
−(β+α)θ
γ+α ) when x
∗ > T IMλ∗ (k). Furthermore, these
threshold quantities satisfy the following ranking:
T IMλ∗ (k) ≤ T IM0 (k) ≤ T IM1 (k)
Remark 6.7. As in the case of the DB update rule, the combined behavior of the within-group dynamics
and the multilevel dynamics can be characterized by three possible regimes:
• x∗ < T IMλ∗ (k): graph structure with IM rule does not help produce cooperation within groups, and
multilevel selection for cooperation is hindered by an increased threshold relative selection strength
λ∗k,IM
• T IMλ∗ (k) < x∗ < T IM1 (k): graph structure does not help cooperation through within-group selection
alone, but helps cooperation via multilevel selection by decreasing the threshold
• x∗ > T IM1 (k): graph structure allows cooperation to be brought about by within-group selection
alone, and achieving additional cooperation via multilevel selection is helped by decreasing the
threshold selection strength λ∗k,IM
The regime in which multilevel selection is hindered through a decreased threshold λ∗k,IM is similar to
the case of the DB update rule, but is not seen in the assortment and reciprocity models of Sections 3,
4, and 5.
Now we illustrate some of the consequences of Proposition 6.6 for various games and neighbor-
hoods sizes k. In Figure 6.6, we illustrate the values of game parameters x∗ and βα that fall into the
different regimes highlighted by Remark 6.7 for the cases of k = 3(top) and k = 4(bottom). For the
case of k = 3, we see that T IMλ∗ (3) = 1 + 2
(
β
α
)
> 1, and f we reduce from the ranking of threshold
quantities that no PD game with intermediate optima x∗ < 1 can have cooperation improved relative
to the well-mixed cases for IM updating with k = 3. As shown in Figure 6.6(top), all PD games with
intermediate group payoff optima fall into the regime in which individual-level selection is not helped
and multilevel selection is made more difficult by the addition of graph structure. For the k = 4 case
in Figure 6.6, we see that there is a small sliver of games with x∗ < 1 with sufficiently small values of βα
such that cooperation can be increased both through individual level on graphs and through decreasing
the threshold relative selection needed to achieve density steady states through multilevel selection.
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Figure 6.6: Regions of payoff parameter space in which multilevel selection and individual-level selection are
helped or harmed by placing interactions on a k-regular graph with the IM update rule, relative to well-mixed
social interactions. Payoff matrices parametrized by Values of group optimum x∗ and the ratio βα , with graphs
satisfying k = 3 (top) and k = 4. When k = 3, all PD games with intermediate optima are harmed by within-
group selection, while, when k = 4, there are some games with intermediate optima in which within-group and
between-group selection are improved relative to well-mixed interactions.
We now display the effects of graph structure on the threshold relative selection strength λ∗k,DB
to enhance cooperation via multilevel selection and the average payoff of the population at steady state
〈Gk(·)〉f . In Figure 6.7, we plot the threshold level of relative selection strength λ∗k,IM as a function of
the number of neighbors k, for three different values of β and fixed values of γ and α. For each of the
three β values that the threshold selection strength is greater for small neighborhood sizes k than it is
for multilevel selection with well-mixed interactions, whose thresholds are depicted by dashed lines of
the same color. For sufficiently large k, we see that all three of our threshold levels λ∗k,IM drop below
the well-mixed threshold value λ∗PD, so placing interactions on k-regular graphs can be beneficial for
facilitating cooperation via multilevel selection at intermediate values of k. Unsurprisingly, we see that
the threshold relative selection strength eventually agrees with the well-mixed threshold for sufficiently
large k, as our formula for λ∗k,IM from Equation 6.13 predicts agreement in the limit as k →∞.
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Figure 6.7: Threshold level of selection λ∗k needed to achieve cooperation via multilevel selection as a function
of neighborhood size k. Threshold levels shown for β = −1 (black), β = − 12 , and β = − 15 , with other parameters
fixed as γ = 32 , α = −1, and θ = 2. The dashed horizontal lines corresponds to the threshold λ∗ for multilevel
selection for well-mixed interactions and within-group selection, with the color of the line corresponding to the
value of β for the dots of the same color. The vertical dashed line corresponds to the minimum neighborhood
size k = 3. For all values of β < 0, there are sufficiently sparse neighborhood sizes k such that the threshold λ
needed to achieve cooperation is higher than under multilevel selection with well-mixed interactions.
In Figure 6.8, we show the average payoffs of the steady state population 〈Gk(·)〉f∞ as a function
of relative selection strength λ for various values of β (solid line) and compare these to the average
payoff at steady state for a population with well-mixed interactions within groups (dashed lines). For
the case k = 3 shown in 6.8(top), we see that the average payoff is worse when games are played on
3-regular graphs than in the well-mixed population for all of our underlying games. This is consistent
with the formula from Proposition 6.6 that all games with intermediate payoff optima x∗ < 1 see an
increasing threshold λ∗3,IM relative to the well-mixed case of well-mixed groups. For the case k = 4
shown in Figure 6.8, we see that the steady state payoffs on the 4-regular graph exceed the payoffs for
the well-mixed population for β = − 114 and β = − 150 , while the graph case does worse than the well-
mixed case when β = −1. With our other parameters fixed at γ = 32 and α = −1, these parameters
were chosen to fit the three possible regimes for PD games with intermediate payoff optima in the k = 4
case. The choice β = −1 corresponds to the case in which x∗ < T IMλ∗ and the threshold λ∗4,IM > λ∗PD,
β = − 114 corresponds to the case in which T IMλ∗ < x∗ < T IM0 in which full-defection remains stable
within-groups but λ∗4,IM < λ
∗
PD, and β = − 150 corresponds to the case x∗ > T IM0 in which the within-
group dynamics can favor a small fraction of cooperators, and additional cooperation can be facilitated
by decreasing the threshold relative selection strength needed to support density-valued steady states.
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Figure 6.8: Average payoff of the steady state population for various values of relative selection strength λ,
for game-theoretic interactions taking place on a k-regular graph under the IM update rule (solid lines) or in
a well-mixed group (dashed lines). Number of neighbors on graph is k = 3 (top) or k = 6 (bottom), and the
value of β varies between β = −1 (black lines), β = − 12 (blue lines), and β = − 110 (red lines). Other parameters
chosen to be γ = 32 , α = −1, α = −1, and θ = 2.
So far, we have seen that a large portion of games with intermediate payoff optima see an increased
threshold of selection λ∗k,IM needed to promote cooperation via multilevel selection relative to the well-
mixed case. However, it does turn out that the IM update rule can still promote a greater level of
steady state population than the well-mixed case in the limit of strong between-group competition as
λ→∞. In Figure 6.9, we use our characterization of the optimal composition of cooperators x∗k from
Equation 6.10 and the characterization of the most abundant group type at steady state in the large
λ limit from Equation 2.23 to display the most-fit and modal group types at steady state for various
numbers of neighbors k. For our choice of parameters, we see that the most-fit and most-abundant
group types agree at full-cooperation between k = 3 and k = 9, while the most abundant group type
at steady state decreases below the optimal level x∗k as the optimal level falls below full-cooperation
for larger values of k. For even larger values of k, the most-fit and modal group types tend towards
the values achieved by the underlying game in a population with well-mixed group interactions. In a
sense, the behavior we see for k between 3 and 9 is a means for eliminating the shadow of lower-level
selection, as introducing graph-structured interactions changes the collective payoff scenario from one
most favoring an intermediate level of cooperation to one pushing for as much cooperation as possible.
52
Figure 6.9: Comparison between group type with maximal payoff x∗k (blue) and most abundant group type
at steady state in the limit as relative selection strength λ → ∞ (green) for multilevel selection with the IM
update rule, plotted as a function of the number of graph neighbors k. The blue and dashed lines correspond
to the corresponding group type with maximal payoff and most abundant group composition at steady state
for well-mixed interactions (or the k → ∞ limit). For this example, we used γ = 3116 and α = −1. The gray
vertical dashed line corresponds to k = 9, the largest value of k for which group payoff Gk(x) is maximized by
the full-cooperator group for our choice of parameters.
7 Discussion
In this paper, we have illustrated the synergistic effects of assortment and reciprocity mechanisms
with multilevel selection for promoting cooperation in group-structured populations. In particular, we
see that the effects of these mechanisms can help to promote cooperation via multilevel selection at
structure parameters much smaller than is required to promote cooperation through individual-level
selection alone, and we see that the mechanisms reduce the level of between-group selection intensity
needed to achieve cooperation relative to well-mixed strategic interactions within groups. In particular,
there are examples of k-regular graph structures with death-birth or imitation updating that cannot
promote any cooperation in games with intermediate group payoff optima, but yet these games and
graphs can see decreased thresholds for relative selection strength to achieve cooperation via multilevel
selection. These results show us that studying the impact of these mechanisms on group performance
provides a new window into the beneficial nature of local population structure. Further, as noted by
Cooney [19], PD games with intermediate payoff optima have often given less attention in the literature,
these results combining multilevel selection and assortment or reciprocity mechanisms provide more
motivation for further study of the promotion of cooperation in games with intermediate collective
optima.
By taking a comparative statics approach to study the directional effects of changing population
structure [44, 45], we were also able to glean the impact of our modeling decisions upon the ability
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of the assortment or reciprocity to support additional cooperation. Furthermore, because we were
analyzing continuous families of parametrized multilevel selection problems, the comparative statics
approach serves as good motivation to apply the techniques needed to analyze general two-level repli-
cator dynamics [19], rather than cherry-picking games with solvable within-group dynamics.
Recent models of indirect reciprocity have included three strategies, those who always defect,
those who always cooperate, and those who cooperate with high-reputation individuals and defect
against low-reputation individuals[49]. Santos et al explore the role of indirect reciprocity under a
variety of social norms, classifying the norms which maximally achieve cooperation [48]. One attributed
mechanism to actually achieve the optimal norm is multilevel selection [60, 61], so a natural question
to ask is whether a deterministic model of multilevel selection can be used to determine the evolution
of optimal norms. To be able to answer such questions, analytical or numerical progress needs to be
made to analyze extensions of our framework to allow for three possible strategies, in which a group’s
strategic composition is represented as a point on a triangular simplex. As such, this motivating
question about the establishment and maintenance of social norms can motivate new mathematical
techniques for multilevel selection.
Regarding the shadow of lower-level selection, the assortment and reciprocity mechanisms had
mixed results. We have established that the mechanisms helped to lower the threshold to achieve
cooperation and served to improve the average payoff of the population and to improve the level
of cooperation at steady state, even eliminate the apperance of a discrepancy between the level of
cooperation maximizing group payoff and the most abundant level of cooperation at steady state as
λ → ∞. However, the majority of these mechanisms did not expand the maximum possible payoff
from the well-mixed group payoff function. In particular, for the assortment, indirect reciprocity and
graph models, it turned out that Gς(x) = γ + α = G(1), the payoff of the full-cooperator group with
well-mixed interactions. As such, we see from Equation 2.18 is still limited by G(1). The one exception
to this was the direct reciprocity model, in which Gδ(1) = 11−δ > G(1), which isn’t particularly fair
because discounting payoffs over multiple rounds produces a large pie of possible payoff. Admittedly,
for large enough structure parameters in our model, we are able to achieve full-cooperation, but average
payoff of the full-cooperator group is not equal to the unachieved social optimum from the well-mixed
model. While it is perfectly reasonable to think that it is difficult to achieve a better outcome than the
payoff that a group full of cooperators could achieve, I believe it is a valuable goal for future research
to determine whether it is possible to introduce mechanisms that can achieve a better fate than that
of a full-cooperator group.
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